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GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY
Justin R. Pidot †

Government actors create law against a backdrop of uncertainty. Limited
information, unpredictable events, and lack of understanding interfere with
accurately predicting a legal regime’s costs, benefits, and effects on other legal and
social programs and institutions. Does the availability of no-fault divorce increase
the number of terminated marriages? Will bulk-collection of telecommunications
information about American citizens reveal terrorist plots? Can a sensitive species
breed in the presence of oil and gas wells? The answers to these questions are far from
clear, but lawmakers must act nonetheless.
The problems posed by uncertainty cut across legal fields. Scholars and
regulators in a variety of contexts recognize the importance of uncertainty, but no
systematic, generally-applicable framework exists for determining how law should
account for gaps in information.
This Article suggests such a framework and develops a typology of strategies for
accounting for uncertainty in governance. This typology includes “static law,” as well
as three varieties of “dynamic law.” “Static law” is a legal rule initially intended to
last in perpetuity. “Dynamic law” is intended to change, and includes: (1) durational
regulation, or fixed legal rules with periodic opportunities for amendment or repeal;
(2) adaptive regulation, or malleable legal rules with procedural mechanisms
allowing rules to change; and (3) contingent regulation, or malleable legal rules with
triggering mechanisms to substantively change the rules.
Each of these strategies, alone or in combination, may best address the
uncertainty inherent in a particular lawmaking effort. This Article provides a
diagnostic framework that lawmakers can use to identify optimal strategies.
Ultimately, this approach to uncertainty yields immediate practical benefits by
enabling lawmakers to better structure governance.
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INTRODUCTION
When governmental actors create legal regimes, they do so in the
face of uncertainty. 1 They predict a regime’s costs, its results, and its
1 When I refer to “legal regimes” or “law” I mean the full panoply of legal rules—statutes,
regulations, and court decisions. Similarly, “lawmakers” constitute those that create legal rules,
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effect on other legal and social institutions. But these predictions are
often just educated guesses. Limited information, unpredictable events,
and lack of understanding mean that lawmakers inevitably face difficult
choices about how to regulate a changing world. Indeed, advances in
knowledge often serve to unmask the extent of uncertainty, rather than
to resolve it. Albert Einstein’s famous statement about mathematics
applies with equal force to law: “As far as the [laws] . . . refer to reality,
they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to
reality.” 2 Governments operate against this backdrop of ubiquitous
uncertainty.
Let’s consider a few examples. When Congress appropriates money
annually to fund the federal government, it makes decisions based on
projections of tax revenue. These projections may be right and they may
be wrong. In 2007, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office
overestimated federal revenue for 2008 by more than $200 billion. 3 At
the start of 2011, the Office underestimated federal revenue for that year
by $70 billion. 4 Likewise, when a state highway department adjusts the
speed limit on a highway to enhance public safety, it may accurately
understand the relationship between speed and public safety, or it may
not. For example, evidence is equivocal that Montana’s accident rate
declined when the state imposed a seventy-five miles per hour daytime
speed limit on highways that had previously been unrestricted. 5
Counterintuitively, posting a speed limit could lead individuals to drive
faster or to refrain from wearing their seat belts. 6 And when public land
managers authorize development of natural resources, they might not
whether they occupy positions in the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of government.
2 Albert Einstein, Geometry and Experience, Lecture Before the Prussian Academy of
Sciences (Jan. 27, 1921), http://www.relativitycalculator.com/pdfs/einstein_geometry_and_
experience_1921.pdf.
3 Compare CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE x
tbl.1 (2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-23update07_0.pdf (estimating 2008 total revenues at $2.771 trillion), with CONG. BUDGET OFF.,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2009 TO 2019 16 tbl.5 (2009),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/01-07-outlook.pdf
(reporting 2008 total revenues of $2.524 trillion); see also CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE
UNCERTAINTY OF BUDGET PROJECTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF DATA AND METHODS (2007),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/03-05-uncertain.pdf.
4 Compare CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS
2011 TO 2021 xii tbl.1 (2011), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-20112012/reports/01-26_fy2011outlook.pdf (estimating 2011 total revenues at $2.228 trillion), with
CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, xii
tbl.1 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/01-312012_Outlook.pdf (reporting 2011 revenues at $2.302 trillion).
5 See, e.g., Press Release, Chad Dornsife, Nat’l Motorists Ass’n, Montana: No Speed Limit
Safety Paradox (May 10, 2001), http://www.motorists.org/press/montana-no-speed-limitsafety-paradox.
6 Id.
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accurately predict how development will affect the health of sensitive
species. For example, in 2000, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
developed a blueprint for natural gas development in the Pinedale
region of Wyoming based on estimates about the effects that
development would have on resident greater sage grouse. 7 Eight years
later, sage grouse populations had declined significantly more than
predicted. 8 These examples demonstrate the obvious: the world is a
dynamic place. The environment, the economy, and technology—each
of these areas involves significant uncertainty. Yet, law must respond to
social, environmental, and economic problems. Lawmakers must act,
even recognizing the limits of their knowledge, or else remain forever
paralyzed. 9
Notwithstanding uncertainty, governance can successfully pursue
the goals of lawmakers. Law can be crafted to forthrightly address
uncertainty and to respond to new and emerging information and
circumstances. Where legal rules serve an instrumental purpose,
accounting for uncertainty may enable those rules to better accomplish
that purpose. 10
Scholars in an array of fields have recognized that legal rules can be
improved by taking account of the uncertainty facing lawmakers. The
efficacy of dynamic and flexible legal regimes has been a dominant
discourse in the field of environmental and natural resources law.11
Scholars in fields as disparate as financial policy 12 and international law
have also considered the issue. 13 Yet despite the widespread interest in
developing governance strategies to account for uncertainty, no legal
scholarship has yet offered a systematic, trans-substantive framework
7 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 69–70 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
8 See, e.g., id.
9 Sometimes, lawmakers invoke uncertainty to justify non-action. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC.
S1693–01 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (opposing extension of the PriceAnderson Act due to a lack of information about the nuclear industry).
10 Where law serves other functions, such as codifying a moral intuition, lawmakers will
still face uncertainty, but it may be less relevant to their decision-making. For advocates of
marriage equality, for example, even if uncertainty existed about the effect that same-sex
marriage would have on marriage rates in the country, such uncertainty would not bear on the
moral imperative to grant same-sex couples equal rights.
11 See, e.g., Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46
AKRON L. REV. 933, 938 (2013); Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law
for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014); Holly Doremus, Adaptive
Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1455, 1459 (2011) [hereinafter
Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem]; Annecoos Wiersema, A Train
Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural
Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1248–53 (2008).
12 See Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 134 (2014).
13 See Rosie Cooney & Andrew T.F. Lang, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive
Governance and International Trade, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 524, 534 (2007).
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for understanding the relationship between governance and
uncertainty. 14
This Article takes up that task. In particular, it develops a typology
of governance strategies, as illustrated in Figure 1, and provides a
diagnostic framework to guide selection among those strategies. This
typology includes what I will refer to as “static law,” as well as three
varieties of “dynamic law.” Static law is defined as substantive legal rules
intended at the outset to regulate in perpetuity. Dynamic law includes
(1) durational regulation, defined as fixed legal rules with periodic
opportunities for amendment or repeal; (2) adaptive regulation, defined
as legal rules coupled with procedural mechanisms to require
reconsideration if new information emerges; and (3) contingent
regulation, defined as legal rules coupled with triggers for automatic
adjustment based on foreseen future events. Each of these tools
appropriately addresses uncertainty in some circumstances. Each
provides benefits and each imposes costs. Understanding the unique
dimensions of each tool can guide lawmakers to create legal regimes
better tailored to achieving desired outcomes.

These tools are classified from an ex ante perspective: the character
of a legal regime is established at the point of its creation, not at any
subsequent point in time. All law, even static law, is subject to
14 By trans-substantive, I mean that principles relating to incorporating uncertainty into
legal rules “do not vary depending upon the antecedent legal regime.” David Marcus, TransSubstantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1193 (2013); see also
David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010).
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amendment or reconsideration. What distinguishes static law from
dynamic law—and adaptive regulation, durational regulation, and
contingent regulation from one another—are the mechanisms by which
lawmakers account for uncertainty at the moment they create a legal
rule. Did lawmakers envision future changes to the law? Did they
facilitate such changes? These are the questions that delineate the
governance strategies examined in this Article.
As a concrete example of these strategies in action, consider the
following situation: A local zoning board debates restricting
construction near the ocean to avoid new development in areas
threatened by a rise in sea level. The board has a suite of options. First, it
could rely on static law and—based on the best information it can
find—prohibit all development within one vertical foot of the best
estimated mean high water line fifty years hence. Such an approach has
advantages. It provides certainty about legal limitations and avoids
public expenditures associated with monitoring sea level rise and
modifying development rules. The approach also has costs because it
may not optimally govern development. If sea level rises by more than
estimated, the one-foot rule will inadequately protect new construction.
If sea level rises by less than estimated, the one-foot rule will overly
restrict the use of land.
As an alternative to static law, the board could rely on durational
regulation and impose the one-foot rule, but make the rule expire in ten
years, forcing the board to revisit the issue at that time and incorporate
new information about any rise in sea level. Or the board could take an
adaptive regulatory approach by imposing the one-foot rule coupled
with a provision that automatically triggers reconsideration if the rate of
sea level rise exceeds expectations. Finally, the board could rely on
contingent regulation and impose the one-foot rule coupled with a
decision tree for regulatory adjustment, allowing the development ban
to automatically adjust to the best scientific prediction for a future rise
in sea level. If estimates for a rise in sea level increased by a foot, the
one-foot ban would become a two-foot ban. If science indicates that the
sea level is no longer expected to change, then the ban would be relaxed.
This Article considers each of these tools as archetypes, evaluating
the purest form of each strategy to reveal core advantages and
disadvantages. In practice, of course, legal regimes will diverge from
these archetypes, incorporating strategies that rely on multiple tools.
While complexity will inevitably occur in the real world, understanding
the strengths and weakness of each distinct approach can lead to better
designs for legal regimes.
The approach lawmakers select to account for uncertainty matters.
Too often, efforts that seem promising in the abstract flounder, resulting
in a system of purportedly dynamic law failing to keep pace with
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unfolding events. Environmental law has borne witness to numerous
such failed efforts as the promise that a legal rule will account for new
information often gives way to political and legal forces invested in the
status quo. For example, the plan BLM adopted in 2000 to govern oil
and gas development in the Pinedale Anticline included a mechanism of
adaptive regulation to adjust the rules as the effects of development on
resident sage grouse became better understood. 15 The plan swiftly
confronted legal challenges, 16 and despite mounting evidence that oil
and gas development was hurting the resident sage grouse population
more than expected, no change in management occurred. 17 In 2008,
BLM abandoned its 2000 plan entirely. 18
Recognizing the strengths and weakness of the tools discussed in
this Article can help lawmakers do a better job taking account of
incomplete information. Contingent regulation in particular may
ameliorate thorny problems that are endemic to previous attempts at
dynamic law. Such efforts have faced stiff obstacles because governing
bodies have often failed to provide the ongoing resources that are
necessary to successfully revisit existing rules and, where such
revisitation has occurred, interest group politics appears to have
obstructed meaningful change. 19 In situations where lawmakers can
accurately predict a range of likely future circumstances, contingent
regulation allows for rapid modification of legal rules without requiring
further intervention by the lawmakers themselves, thereby avoiding the
delay and commitment of resources attendant to reconsideration of
existing rules. At the same time, contingent regulation carries baggage:
unlike adaptive or durational regulation, contingent regulation cannot
respond to unforeseen circumstances or incorporate strategies that
develop after enactment of the legal regime. It is, in other words,
significantly less nimble than other forms of dynamic law.
Before proceeding further, a word on nomenclature is necessary.
This Article develops a set of standardized terms. Existing terminology
is both underinclusive and overinclusive. The terms used here—static
law, durational regulation, adaptive regulation, and contingent
15 See THEODORE ROOSEVELT CONSERVATION P’SHIP, PINEDALE ANTICLINE FACT SHEET 3,
http://www.trcp.org/assets/pdf/pinedale-anticline-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
16 See id. (explaining that the Pindedale Anticline Working Group, a citizens’ advisory
committee, was challenged as a violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
17 See Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
18 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT app. 10-2 (2008) [hereinafter BLM 2008 SEIS APPENDIX], http://www.blm.gov/style/
medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/pfodocs/anticline/fseis.Par.41023.File.dat/11App10.pdf.
19 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in
Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 329–34 (2007).
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regulation—refer precisely to the mechanisms in a legal regime that
allow (or not) new information to modify that regime. Sometimes, these
terms cut more broadly than those currently in use. For example,
durational regulation encompasses law that includes termination dates,
which others have termed “experimental rules” or “temporary
legislation,” and other techniques for promoting reconsideration of legal
rules. 20 The terms used in this Article do not encompass ancillary
measures that are necessary for successful dynamic law. For example,
the term adaptive management, which is ubiquitous in the
environmental and natural resources literature, often refers to a legal
regime that includes both an internal procedure for modifying legal
rules, which this Article would describe as adaptive regulation, and a
comprehensive monitoring program to derive information about
environmental conditions that can fuel that process of modification. 21
Environmental monitoring, and other means of assessing the
effectiveness of law, is a necessary component of any effective strategy to
make law respond to changing circumstances. Otherwise, new
information may not emerge. Monitoring is, however, distinct from the
legal mechanisms that enable dynamism, and such efforts are not
included as part of the definition of adaptive regulation.
The terms used here also avoid conceptual muddiness that has
arisen in the existing literature. For example, some scholars and
regulatory documents use the term adaptive management to refer to any
mechanism that allows regulatory regimes to change, regardless of
whether that mechanism involves substance or procedure. 22 Others
insist that only process-oriented mechanisms for change constitute true
adaptive management. 23 This Article disaggregates process- and
substance-based mechanisms into adaptive regulation and contingent
regulation, sidestepping this debate and allowing independent analysis
of each strategy.
Finally, this Article holds certain things constant as it explores
governance strategies. First, it does not address vexing problems about
how to set goals for governance and, relatedly, how to establish risk
20 Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007); See Gubler, supra
note 12.
21 See, e.g., Biber, supra note 11, at 934–35; Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the
Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenge of “New Age” Environmental Protection,
41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 53 (2001) [hereinafter Doremus, “New Age” Environmental Protection].
22 See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and
Back Again, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 71–72 (2005); Courtney Schultz & Martin Nie,
Decision-Making Triggers, Adaptive Management, and Natural Resources Law and Planning, 52
NAT. RESOURCES J. 443, 444 (2012).
23 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 424, 426, 430–31 (2010).
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tolerance in any particular legal regime. 24 Second, it does not address
what policy instruments best achieve established goals. Strenuous
disagreement exists about whether regulatory prohibitions or market
mechanisms optimally address social problems. These debates are
orthogonal to the issues explored here. 25 Either approach could be
deployed as static law, durational regulation, adaptive regulation, or
contingent regulation. Third, debates about lawmaking often involve
discussions about locating decisions with the appropriate government
actor—local, state, federal, or international. 26 That debate also does little
to inform the choice between dynamic and static law. Governments at
all levels can avail themselves of the suite of strategies discussed here. 27
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides an account of
uncertainty across contexts. Part II discusses static law, identifies
examples, and explores the benefits and burdens created by relying on
that approach. Part III provides similar treatment to each form of
dynamic law. And Part IV provides a diagnostic framework to enable
lawmakers to better design legal regimes in particular circumstances. It
does so by exploring the costs and benefits of making law dynamic, the
variability of uncertainty, and the resource constraints that lawmakers
face. Different combinations of these factors suggest certain and
identifiable regulatory responses.
A more systematic approach to governing uncertainty will result in
better governance and better social outcomes. This Article provides
guideposts for lawmakers who are faced with the difficult task of
creating legal rules without complete information.
I. UNCERTAINTY ACROSS CONTEXT
Lawmakers never act with perfect information. Never. Social and
natural conditions change, prevailing norms evolve, and even in the
absence of change, lawmakers often misunderstand both the conditions
24 See Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV.
265, 270 (2009).
25 A market-based approach that creates tradable emissions permits could, for example,
include a contingent approach if additional permits were set to be injected into the market if
the price of each permit exceeded a certain threshold.
26 See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J.
795, 803 (2005).
27 That is not to say that the nature of the governmental entity that is engaged in lawmaking
is unimportant to the selection of appropriate tools. As discussed in Part IV.C, infra, the
resource endowment of a lawmaking body is an important factor in designing a dynamic legal
regime. Resource endowment may loosely correlate with the level of government—for example,
federal agencies may possess more resources then municipal governments—but tool selection is
not sensitive to the level of government itself.
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they seek to control and the effects of the regulatory interventions they
select. A legal tool well-suited to control a relatively rare activity may
become antiquated, inefficient, or ineffective if that activity becomes
common. 28 Nonetheless, law is often made with little thought about the
eventuality of new information emerging or about social conditions
changing. Sometimes that approach makes sense. Sometimes the
uncertainties facing lawmakers are modest, and the benefits of a stable
legal regime outweigh the benefits that would accrue from dynamic and
responsive legal rules. Not always.
Uncertainty is not monolithic. 29 Lawmakers may know virtually
nothing about a significant aspect of a problem they seek to address. For
example, if the international community decides to pursue a strategy of
geoengineering to reduce the magnitude of climate change, that effort
would face staggering uncertainty about the efficacy of the intervention
and the potential magnitude of any secondary effects. 30 On the other
hand, uncertainty may be of a lesser degree. For example, when a city
decides to open a new library, it may not be able to perfectly forecast the
number of patrons, but based on its experience, it may be able to arrive
at a reasonable estimate, and in any event the consequences of
misestimating may be modest. Uncertainty also may be foreseen or
entirely unknown. In other words, lawmakers may understand their
own lack of knowledge, or they may be unaware of that deficit.
The problems uncertainty poses for governance has received
considerable attention in a few contexts, particularly in environmental
and natural resources law, which over the course of decades has
attempted to reinvent the regulatory state to enable an iterative
decision-making process that continually incorporates new
information. 31 Recently, J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman have engaged in
broader examination of one type of legal change: the termination of
legal regimes, which they refer to as exit. 32 In essence, exit is simply a
28 Hannah Wiseman has referred to the phenomenon of a governance decisions becoming
inefficacious due to the increasing scale of a regulated activity as a “regulatory diseconomy of
scale.” Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235,
238 (2014).
29 See infra Part IV.B.
30 See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q.
673, 678 (2013) (“[G]eoengineering involves grave uncertainties and potential hazards.”).
31 See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 11, at 1, 7. “Adaptive management,” as this effort is
labeled in regulatory reform, has received considerable attention. Westlaw’s database of journal
and law review articles indicates that nearly 300 articles have used the term “adaptive
management” in the same paragraph as “natural resources” or “environment.”
32 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482392.
Ruhl
and
Salzman
comprehensively analyze the means by which both regulatory and benefit providing
government programs end. They argue that “it is as important to think clearly about exit in the

PIDOT.37.1.3 (Do Not Delete)

2015]

10/26/2015 1:05 PM

G O VE R N A N C E A N D U N C E R T A I N T Y

123

form of radical legal evolution that occurs when lawmakers respond to
new information or changing circumstances that demonstrate that a
legal regime is beyond saving, or perhaps, that the targeted problem has
been solved. In any case, as with the problem of exit, the core task of
governing in the face of uncertainty is trans-substantive. Similarities in
the task of governing without complete information suggest similarities
in response. Lawmakers seeking to protect environmental assets can
learn from lawmakers seeking to protect the health of financial markets
and vice versa.
This Part sets the stage for the exploration that follows by briefly
discussing uncertainty in three contexts: the regulation of driving,
financial markets, and environment and natural resources. These fields
involve local, state, federal, and international government entities. 33 All
branches of government are involved, including legislatures, executive
branch agencies, and courts. In other words, these examples reveal that
an analysis of uncertainty and governance can guide the decisions of
virtually all governmental actors.
A.

Driving

The most straightforward of the three examples is driving
regulations, sometimes referred to as the “rules of the road.” 34 Some
rules of the road are constant, such as requiring driving on the right
hand side of the road in the United States. 35 Others vary from location
to location and over time, such as applicable speed limits.
Uncertainty pervades decisions about the rules of the road. Start
with the most fundamental tenet of traffic regulations in the United
States: drivers must use the right side of the road. 36 This rule was
administrative state as it is to think clearly about the creation of new programs in the first
place.” Id. at 38. I agree that questions about regulatory exit are crucial. Law makers should
consider exit strategies alongside other issues related to the evolution of legal rules.
33 For a discussion of interactions between levels of government institution, see Justin
Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213, 243–54 (2013) [hereinafter Pidot,
Deconstructing Disaster]. See also, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural
Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 184 (2005) (discussing cooperative federalism).
34 See the rule of the road, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010), http://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/166506?isAdvanced=true&result=1&rskey=AhhFIw& (defined at note P15 to the
entry for “road”) (defining “rule of the road” as “more generally (usu. in pl.) a set of rules and
guidance for road users”).
35 See, e.g., Convention on Road Traffic art. 9, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008.
36 The importance of standardizing the side of the road used within a particular jurisdiction
is sufficiently great that an international convention has been ratified by 95 countries requiring
standardization. The Convention on Road Traffic provides that “[a]ll vehicular traffic
proceeding in the same direction on any road shall keep to the same side of the road, which
shall be uniform in each country for all roads.” Id.
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developed as a custom in the colonial era and was first codified by the
Pennsylvania state legislature in 1792. 37 Selecting a driving side had
consequences that were unforeseen at the time. A study published by J.J.
Leeming in 1969 found that fewer traffic accidents occur in countries
that require driving on the left. 38 Christian Foerch and Helmuth
Steinmetz explain that this phenomenon may occur, at least in part,
because of asymmetric patterns in the development of brain lesions
following a stroke. 39 When the United States adopted its rules regarding
driving side, this information did not exist. Uncertainty, then, colored
even this oft-cited example of a “coordination norm,” in which the
specifics of a legal rule are viewed as inconsequential. 40 In other words,
even the most basic, seemingly unimportant, lawmaking exercises
involve uncertainty because the consequences of those exercises may not
be fully understood.
Establishing speed limits also involves uncertainty. Public roads in
the United States have posted speed limits to promote public safety. 41
The relationship between speed limits and public safety, however,
continues to be debated, 42 as does the degree of safety afforded by any
37 See An Act to Enable the Governor of this Commonwealth to Incorporate a Company for
Making an Artificial Road from the City of Philadelphia to the Borough of Lancaster, ch. 1640,
§ 21 (1792), reprinted in 14 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 279, 293
(James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1909), http://www.palrb.us/statutesatlarge/17001799/
1792/0/act/1640.pdf; see also Richard F. Weingroff, On the Right Side of the Road, FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/right.cfm (last updated Oct. 17,
2013). Historians have speculated that the custom emerged either as a means of distancing the
colony from the traditions of England or because of predominant right-handedness and
accessibility to whips and guns. Id.; Dan Keegan, Driving on the Wrong Side, DRIVERS.COM
(Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.drivers.com/article/332.
38 J.J. LEEMING, ROAD ACCIDENTS: PREVENT OR PUNISH (1969).
39 Christian Foerch & Helmuth Steinmetz, Left-Sided Traffic Directionality May Be the Safer
“Rule of the Road” for Ageing Populations, 73 MED. HYPOTHESES 20, 20 (2009).
40 Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1186
(2013) (“Some conventions are probably pure coordination norms, such as driving on one side
of the road or the other (or so a stock example runs).” (footnote omitted)); see also Richard H.
McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1060 (2005)
(identifying the “choice of whether to drive on the left or right side of the road” as a “pure
coordination game”). The fact that driving-side rules affect public health does not mean that
they should not be viewed as a coordination norm, since the coordination function of such
rules predominates. Rather, this example illustrates that every choice—even those involving
coordination norms—may have unforeseen consequences.
41 See State Traffic and Speed Laws, MASS. INST. TECH., http://www.mit.edu/~jfc/laws.html#
types (last modified Apr. 12, 2015). Speed limits can also serve other goals, including
promotion of efficient transportation and fuel economy. See, e.g., Allen M. Brabender, The
Misapplication of Minnesota’s Speeding Statute and the Need to Raise the Posted Limit or
Expand Use of the Dimler Amendment, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 4 (2004); Barbara Kritchevsky,
Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations of State Laws Enacted Pursuant to Federal Mandates
Should Not Be Negligence Per Se, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 693, 695 (2009).
42 See, e.g., Dornsife, supra note 5 (arguing that Montana speed limits did not improve
public safety); Lee S. Friedman et al., Long-Term Effects of Repealing the National Maximum
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particular speed limit along any particular stretch of road. Some studies
suggest that speed limits have little effect on average driving speeds, and
others suggest that average driving speeds may have little effect on
public safety. 43 Moreover, some studies find that reducing a speed limit
may sometimes cause more accidents. 44 Local and state transportation
regulators must act with the knowledge that they cannot predict the
results of their actions perfectly.
B.

Environment and Natural Resources

Environmental and natural resources law has an intimate
relationship with the science of natural systems. 45 Scholars and
lawmakers fixate on uncertainty because of a sea change in the scientific
understanding of ecology. 46 When Congress enacted most federal
environmental laws, the majority of scientists viewed the natural world
as inherently stable: ecosystems followed predictable evolutionary
stages, often referred to as stages of succession, and perturbations in the
natural environment dampened over time. 47 Nature resembled a lake’s
surface on a windless day. A rock cast into the lake would create ripples,
but those ripples would diminish and ultimately disappear. Under this
account, human activity disturbed a natural equilibrium state,
threatening permanent disturbance of the natural condition.
Environmental and natural resources law sought to minimize and
ameliorate that disturbance, seeking a return to the placidity of the
lake’s surface.
The trouble with the equilibrium view of ecology is that it fails to
explain changes observed in natural systems in the absence of human
intervention. As a result, that view fell into disrepute. 48 The ecological
model that replaced it posited that the state of nature is a “complex,

Speed Limit in the United States, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1626, 1626 (2009) (finding a 9.1%
increase of fatalities on rural interstates following the repeal of federal speed limit).
43 See FRED MANNERING, THE EFFECTS OF INTERSTATE SPEED LIMITS ON DRIVING SPEEDS:
SOME NEW EVIDENCE (2007), http://ibtta.org/sites/default/files/Speed%20Limit%20and%
20factors%20safety.pdf; Patrick McCarthy, Effect of Speed Limits on Speed Distributions and
Highway Safety: A Survey of Recent Literature, 21 TRANSPORT REVIEWS 31, 36–37 (2001).
44 See MANNERING, supra note 43.
45 See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 193, 194 (1996) (arguing that “environmental law and management should derive their
primary political power and legitimacy from science”); Wiersema, supra note 11, at 1245.
46 See, e.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 9–12 (1993).
47 See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 863–69 (1994).
48 See id. at 869.
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stochastic nonequilibrium one.” 49 The popular notion of the “butterfly
effect,” which fancifully describes the flap of a butterfly’s wings causing
a tornado on the other side of the globe, captures the essence of this
model. 50 With the rise of this new understanding of ecology, legal
scholars advocated for a new model of regulation. J.B. Ruhl, among the
most prolific of these scholars, explained the need for regulatory
reinvention: “To manage the impact of human society on the inherently
chaotic, adaptive environment, the environmental law system itself must
possess those dynamical qualities.” 51
Uncertainty in environmental and natural resources law is not
abstract. The BLM regulates natural gas development on federal lands in
Sublette County, Wyoming that overlie a geologic formation known as
the Pinedale Anticline, which is believed to contain the third largest
natural gas reserve in the United States. 52 Large numbers of natural gas
wells permeate the area. 53 Those lands also provide important habitats
for the greater sage grouse, 54 a species being considered for listing under
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 55 Evidence suggests that oil and gas
development disrupts greater sage grouse mating rituals, thereby
reducing the population. 56 The extent of that effect remains unclear, as
does the distance in time at which the effect declines or disappears. 57
49 A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of
Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1994); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, Law
and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 327
(1995) (reviewing JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN
OUR TIME (1994)).
50 See THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT (New Line Cinema 2004). For the origins of the term, see
Edward N. Lorenz, Professor of Meteorology, Mass. Inst. of Tech., Predictability; Does the Flap
of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas, Address at the 139th Meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (Dec. 29, 1972).
51 J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean
Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 940 (1997)
[hereinafter Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law].
52 See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2012); Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661
F.3d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
53 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL AND GAS
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 4 (2008) [hereinafter BLM ROD],
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/pfodocs/anticline/
rod.Par.50775.File.dat/00ROD.pdf.
54 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 1 FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT 3-140–3-147 (2008) [hereinafter BLM 2008 SEIS], http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/
blm/wy/information/NEPA/pfodocs/anticline/fseis.Par.30367.File.dat/vol1_ea.pdf.
55 See, e.g., Diane Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, Frack Quietly, Please: Sage Grouse is Nesting,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2014, at A1.
56 See BLM 2008 SEIS, supra note 54, at 3-143.
57 As BLM considered reauthorizing an oil and gas development plan in 2008, wildlife
groups urged it to impose a two-mile buffer zone around leks, which are areas in which a
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Moreover, other factors also contribute to the decline of the greater sage
grouse, including livestock management, 58 invasive plants, wildfire
frequency, climate change, and direct habitat loss and fragmentation. 59
As a result, it is unknown whether regulating oil and gas development
can slow or halt the decline of the greater sage grouse population, or
what regulatory interventions will best protect the species.
Traditional environmental law also encounters uncertainty. The
Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
establish a primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS)
for seven air pollutants at a level sufficient to protect public health,
allowing for “an adequate margin of safety.” 60 The public health effects
of air pollution are, however, incompletely understood. For example, in
2011 the EPA undertook a review of the primary NAAQS for carbon
monoxide, considering epidemiological data suggesting that carbon
monoxide could pose a greater risk to human health than previously
thought. 61 The EPA determined, however, that the data failed to
demonstrate a causal link between carbon monoxide concentrations and
adverse health effects. 62 Because that link was sufficiently uncertain in
the EPA’s view, it declined to more strictly regulate carbon monoxide. 63
C.

Financial Markets

Understanding financial markets—as well as the entities that
participate in them and the transactions that affect them—also involves

species performs communal mating rituals. See Steve Davies, BLM’s Pinedale Anticline EIS
Survives Appeal, ENDANGERED SPECIES & WETLANDS REP. (Nov. 18, 2011),
http://www.eswr.com/2011/11/blms-pinedale-anticline-eis-survives-appeal. BLM opted to
impose a half-mile buffer zone instead. BLM ROD, supra note 53, at A-18.
58 See Greater Sage-Grouse Umbrella Candidate Conservation Agreement with Assurances
for Wyoming Ranch Management between [redacted private landowner(s)] and the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv. (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.fws.gov/wyominges/PDFs/Species_Listed/Umbrella_
CCAA/WY%20Statewide%20Ranch%20Management%20Sage-grouse%20CCAA.pdf.
59 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THE GREATER SAGE-GROUSE: FACTS, FIGURES AND
DISCUSSION 2 (2015), http://www.fws.gov/greatersagegrouse/factsheets/GreaterSageGrouse
Canon_FINAL.pdf.
60 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (b)(1) (2012); see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW156–
57 (2d ed. 1994). The EPA cannot consider other facts, such as the cost that a NAAQS might
impose. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001); see also David M.
Driesen, Should Congress Direct the EPA to Allow Serious Harms to Public Health to Continue?:
Cost-Benefit Tests and NAAQS Under the Clean Air Act, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 223 (1998).
61 See Review of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Carbon Monoxide, 76 Fed.
Reg. 54,294, 54,294–54,297 (Aug. 31, 2011).
62 See Cmtys. for a Better Env’t v. EPA, 748 F.3d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
63 Id.
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uncertainty. 64 A few seemingly simple and widely agreed upon goals
dominate regulation in this field: economic regulation should aim for
stable growth, low unemployment, controlled inflation, 65 and should
prevent fraud and other dishonest dealings that destabilize the
economy. 66 How government can best accomplish those goals, and
whether government intervention can succeed at all, are hotly
contested. 67 This dispute is in part ideological, but it is compounded by
a lack of knowledge and information. As Roberta Romano has
explained, “the nub of the regulatory problem derives from the fact that
financial firms operate in a dynamic environment in which there are
many unknowns and unknowables and state-of-the-art knowledge
quickly obsolesces.”68

64 Indeed, as Steven McNamara has explained, scholars debate even the extent to which the
function of financial systems can be understood:

For the academics who study the financial system, derivatives regulation highlights
certain crucial epistemological questions: What are the limits of the evidence that can
be drawn on to obtain an accurate understanding of the financial system?: How
should we view propositions that we highly suspect may be true but cannot
confidently prove? And how should we deal with uncertainty, both in the attempt to
accurately understand the financial system, and in the possible effects of the
regulations we impose on it?
Steven McNamara, Financial Markets Uncertainty and the Rawlsian Argument for Central
Counterparty Clearing of OTC Derivatives, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 211
(2014).
65 Congress has entrusted these responsibilities to the Federal Reserve and the Federal Open
Market Committee. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012) (“The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the
monetary and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to
increase production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”).
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2012) (justifying regulation of securities transactions because
“[n]ational emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of
trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect
the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden
and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such
exchanges and markets”).
67 See, e.g., Editorial, Jobs and the Fed: Near-Zero Interest Rates Haven’t Led to Robust
Economic Growth, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2014, 5:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/jobs-andthe-fed-1406933061; Patrick Brennan, Rand Paul Endorses an Aggressive Fed, NAT'L REV.:
CORNER BLOG (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/355385/randpaul-endorses-aggressive-fed-patrick-brennan; Peter Wallison, Hey, Barney Frank: The
Government Did Cause the Housing Crisis, ATLANTIC (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/hey-barney-frank-the-government-didcause-the-housing-crisis/249903.
68 Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF
CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 87 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012); see also Brett McDonnell,
Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN.
ST. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011) (“How do we go about regulating financial markets and institutions in
light of the vast uncertainty that confronts both the regulators and the regulated?”).
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Consider the “great recession” that began in 2007. 69 The public
looked to Congress and other government entities to implement policies
to promote economic recovery and to safeguard against another
catastrophic failure in the financial markets. 70 That task was made
difficult because lawmakers acted “with a radically inadequate
understanding of what went wrong and of the effect proposed
regulations w[ould] likely have.” 71
Uncertainty for financial regulators exists even in ordinary
economic times. For example, when the Federal Reserve establishes a
target interest rate in hopes of spurring economic growth while avoiding
undue inflation, it can do no more than make an educated guess about
the effects of its decision. 72 Similarly, when Congress and the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) impose disclosure
obligations on financial institutions or prohibit certain types of
transactions, they make educated guesses that the adopted policy will
generate benefits in terms of transparency and economic stability
without unnecessarily increasing transaction costs or prohibiting
experimentation that could lead to growth. 73 In each circumstance, the
lawmaker—Congress, the Federal Reserve, and the SEC—knows that
any policy would involve substantial tradeoffs, but the magnitude of
those tradeoffs is unknown, and possibly unknowable.
D.

And Everywhere Else

These three examples illustrate the sheer breadth of the challenges
posed by uncertainty. Uncertainty exists everywhere, including
whenever the government acts. Will increasing prison sentences for
migrants convicted of illegal reentry deter noncitizen drug traffickers, as
69 See Chris Isidore, The Great Recession: Economists Generally Agree This Is the Worst
Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression, but They Say Despite Pain, Another Depression
Isn’t Likely, CNN (Mar. 25, 2009, 5:19 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/25/news/economy/
depression_comparisons. This worldwide economic downturn had numerous causes, and the
collapse of the financial markets was, in a sense, a symptom of systemic problems in credit
markets and in other sectors. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST
DEMOCRACY 5–7 (2010).
70 See, e.g., Buffett Warns Congress: Lawmakers Face “Biggest Financial Meltdown in
American History” If They Don’t Act, CNN (Sept. 28, 2008, 11:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/
2008/09/28/news/economy/Buffett.bailout/?postversion=2008092811.
71 See McDonnell, supra note 68, at 2–3.
72 See, e.g., Richard Clarida et al., The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian
Perspective, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661, 1661 (1999) (“[A] stream of empirical work
beginning in the late 1980s has made the case that monetary policy significantly influences the
short-term course of the real economy. The precise amount remains open to debate.” (footnote
omitted)).
73 See Gubler, supra note 12, at 137–38.

PIDOT.37.1.3 (Do Not Delete)

130

10/26/2015 1:05 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:113

some proponents of amendments to the Immigration and Nationality
Act argued? 74 Does no-fault divorce increase the number of terminated
marriages? Will bulk collection of telecommunications information
about American citizens reveal terrorist plots? Does legalization of
marijuana increase childhood use of the drug? Will trade sanctions
affect Russia’s activities in Ukraine?
The list of questions facing lawmakers is endless, and these
questions often cut to the heart of their efforts at governance. If
Congress sought to reduce drug smuggling by enhancing prison terms
for those convicted of illegal reentry, and the increase had no deterrent
effect, then Congress made the wrong choice. 75 To account for the
possibility of error, lawmakers have a variety of tools from which to
select.
II. STATIC LAW
Lawmakers design static law to withstand the test of time. This
mode of regulating has historically been the default for law. Consider
canonical historical examples: the Ten Commandments, Hammurabi’s
Code, and the code of Justinian, each inscribed in stone—a symbol of
durability and longevity. 76 The story of Moses descending from Mount
Sinai clutching two tablets inscribed with the Decalogue does not
envision a future where the rule “thou shalt not kill” is revisited based
on experience with its efficacy and effect. 77 That rule, and others
believed to be established by divine command, are laws intended for
eternal application, insensitive to new information, changing
circumstances, or evolving cultural norms. This method of governing
constitutes static law.

74 See 133 CONG. REC. S4992-01 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1987) (statement of Sen. Chiles)
(proposing “[a] bill to provide for additional criminal penalties for deported aliens who reenter
the United States”); see also Bindu Jacob, Notes & Comments, Immigration Law: Criminal
Penalties for Deported Aliens Who Illegally Reenter the United States—Hugo Roman
Almendarez-Torres v United States, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 401,
414–15 (2000) (describing the history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 provision that
enhanced criminal penalties for deported aliens who reenter the United States).
75 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1366–68 (2014); Zoey T. Jones, Note, Prescribing Disproportionate
Punishment: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Illegal Reentry, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1217,
1234 (2012).
76 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1331 (2003)
(“In times past, we have fancied law a product of the Deity, and we are still apt to depict it as
something transcendent, or even broodingly omnipresent, if not divine.”).
77 Exodus 20:13 (King James).
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Static law transcends religious traditions. For parts of the United
States’ legal history, judges were understood to uncover common law
legal rules from objectively derivable—thereby permanent—principles. 78
The notion of stare decisis, which retains significant importance and
resonance today, is also a static approach to law. When judges render
decisions, they act with the expectation that in the absence of unusual
circumstances, the decisions they make will remain binding. 79
Static law may appear insensitive to uncertainty. It is better
understood, however, as a method of addressing uncertainty. Tuning a
legal rule to new information and circumstances involves costs, and
static law represents a conclusion that the benefit of legal stability
outweighs the benefits of crafting a dynamic legal regime. This means
that lawmakers may select static law as the optimal tool to achieve their
goals even in circumstances where they recognize that substantial
uncertainty exists.
A.

The Structure of Static Law

Static law is a certain and ascertainable legal rule created without
provision for future modification of that rule. The theoretical model is
straightforward: lawmakers identify a problem, then adopt a regulatory
intervention to address that problem. In doing so, lawmakers intend for
the intervention to remain fixed, making no special allowances that
could facilitate a future modification. To the challenge of uncertainty,
static law answers: if in the future relevant information emerges, existing
legal rules will continue to apply.
Statutory, regulatory, and constitutional law each incorporates
static law. It may manifest at different levels of generality, encompassing
both rules and standards, with varying degrees of malleability attendant

78 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780–1860 8
(1977) (“The equation of common law with a fixed, customary standard meant that judges
conceived of their role as merely that of discovering and applying preexisting legal rules.”); see
also Matthew Steilen, Judicial Review and Non-Enforcement at the Founding, 17 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 479, 554 (2014) (“[A]t the turn of the nineteenth century[,] . . . American courts
turned away from a static private-law regime.”).
79 Stare decisis is defined as “[t]he doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Stare Decisis, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For two discussions of the doctrine in general, see Michael S.
Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the
Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2008), and
Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723,
728 (1988).
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to each of those legal forms. 80 The requirement of driving on the right
side of the road falls on the rule side of the equation—it is precise and
not subject to interpretation or nuance. 81 The prohibition that a law
enforcement officer may not use excessive force is, on the other hand, a
static standard. 82 While the application of that standard to any
particular circumstance will vary, and the standard itself takes account
of the totality of the circumstances, it is intended to be a persistent
limitation on law enforcement activities. 83 Static law standards may
incorporate evolving cultural norms, and thus appear to change. For
example, the doctrine allowing legal proscription of obscene material is
based, in part, on “contemporary community standards.” 84 But that
legal standard—that is, the governing legal rule—remains static.
To be sure, static law does not mean that a legal rule will last
forever in practice, only that at its inception no provision is made to
facilitate change. Legal regimes of all stripes end. As James Salzman and
J.B. Ruhl have observed, “exit is . . . a ubiquitous, inevitable feature of
governance.” 85 Where a legal regime does not plan for its own
termination or modification, it can nonetheless evolve through
amendment or repeal, or it can be overruled by judicial decisions. But
amending static law often requires significant investment of resources,
and doing so may destabilize settled expectations that stem from the
belief that the legal regime will persist. 86
Modern efforts to develop modalities of dynamic law, discussed in
Part III, respond to the perceived failings in static law, particularly to the
perception that static law fails to address emerging information. 87 While
80 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 27, 57–69 (1992); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 562 (1992).
81 See 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 652 (“The fundamental rule of traffic is to keep to the
right even though there is no oncoming traffic.” (footnote omitted)).
82 See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 445–55 (2012) (discussing
excessive force doctrine). This requirement is also an example of a legal standard created by the
judiciary, as the excessive force limitation is a judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
83 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
84 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
85 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 32, at 4.
86 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 548 (1991) (“By announcing
new rules prospectively or by applying them selectively, a court may dodge the stare decisis
bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us from
disturbing our settled precedents.”).
87 See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1464
(“[A]daptive management was a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of management based
on pre-decision comprehensive analysis.”). A famous (or notorious, depending on your
perspective) mechanism by which early environmental law purported to identify appropriate
regulation in the face of uncertainty was the “precautionary principle.” See, e.g., Michael Ilg,
Complexity, Environment, and Equitable Competition: A Theory of Adaptive Rule Design, 41
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it is true that static law is not intended to change, that itself is a response
to uncertainty, and an appropriate response in some circumstances,
particularly where the costs imposed by dynamic law outweigh the
benefits of making law responsive. 88
B.

Static Law Across Context

Static law abounds in all manner of legal contexts. Consider a few
examples: The right side driving rule constitutes quintessential static
law. When legislatures adopted this rule, they envisioned no mechanism
for the rule changing. Around the world it is exceptionally rare for a
nation to change its laws governing which side of the road to use. 89
The Constitution creates a blueprint for our federal government.
Article V of the Constitution allows for amendment, but it does so only
through a process significantly more onerous than by a majority vote, 90
thereby making constitutional rules the most difficult legal rules to
change in the United States. 91 Only sixteen amendments currently exist,
in addition to the first ten Amendments in the Bill of Rights,92 which is
fewer than one amendment for every decade of the Constitution’s

GEO. J. INT’L L. 647, 651–53 (2010). While analysis of the merits of the precautionary principle
lie beyond the scope of this Article, it would, in essence, resolve uncertainty in favor of
enhanced environmental protection. See id. Lawmakers could rely on the precautionary
principle as a rule of decision in formulating any of the varieties of law discussed in this Article.
88 See infra Part IV.A.
89 See Tom Vanderbilt, Whose Side of the Road Are You on?: For the First Time in Ages, a
Country Is Switching to Driving on the Left. Should We all Drive on the Same Side?, SALON (Aug.
14, 2009, 6:19 AM), http://www.salon.com/2009/08/14/driving_on_left.
90 U.S. Const. art. V.
91 See Justin R. Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 29 (2012) (citing
Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review and Interpretation: Have the Courts Become Sovereign
When Interpreting the Constitution?, in AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY: THE
JUDICIAL BRANCH 116, 132–33 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005)). Arguably,
Article V does envision amendment, and therefore the Constitution could be viewed as a form
of dynamic law. Because the amendment process is more difficult than the baseline of
amendment by majority vote, it is better conceived of as an effort in static law. The difficulty of
amending constitutional provisions does not make them more static law than statutes. The
definition of static law used in this Article relies on whether lawmakers incorporated means of
facilitating modification when first enacting law. The challenges imposed by Article V do,
however, illustrate that static law may be virtually permanent both in terms of the initial
intentions of the lawmakers and in terms of the experience of the law moving forward.
92 See The Constitution: Amendments 11–27, ARCHIVES.GOV, http://www.archives.gov/
exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) (stating
that first ten Amendments make up the Bill of Rights and that the Eighteenth Amendment was
repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment).
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existence. 93 As a result, constitutional provisions like the First
Amendment’s prohibition on “abridging the freedom of speech” have
remained a fixed component of the United States’ governing
architecture. 94
The U.S. Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1990, 95 and
Congress enacted legislation to implement aspects of the Convention in
1994. 96 The Convention allows for no deviations from its absolute
prohibition on torture. 97 Sanford Levinson has described the
Convention and other laws prohibiting torture as “establish[ing] a
Ulyssean contract to be honored whatever the lure of the Sirens,
including the alleged justifications attached to engaging in war or
responding to other national emergencies.” 98 Then, following the attacks
on September 11, 2001, the “war on terror” began. 99 Neither the future
occurrence of these transformative events, nor the effects of the
commitment not to torture, could have been known in 1994.
Nonetheless, Congress did not provide for modification when it
implemented the Convention, but rather, it held fast to the normative
commitment that torture is always bad.
The General Mining Law of 1872 has governed the process by
which private individuals can acquire a right to mine on federal land for
well over a century. 100 The conditions in 1872 differed dramatically from
those of today. The statute includes no mechanism to facilitate
modification and “[d]espite much contemporary hostility to the Mining
Law of 1872 and high level political pressure by influential individuals
and organizations for its repeal, all repeal efforts have failed, and it
remains the law.” 101 Decisions by federal agencies to grant permits
similarly constitute static law because many such permits lack
mechanisms for modifying the permit’s terms. For example, when the
Army Corps of Engineers issues a permit to authorize the filling of a

93 See A More Perfect Union: The Creation of the U.S. Constitution, ARCHIVES.GOV,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015)
(stating that the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1788).
94 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
95 See 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
96 See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382 (1994).
97 See Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in
the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2014 (2003).
98 Id. at 2017.
99 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
100 See, e.g., High Country Citizens All. v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177, 1179, 1182–85 (10th Cir.
2006) (citing 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–47 (2012)).
101 United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).
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waterway under section 404(a) of the Clean Water Act, 102 the permit
does not include a provision to require later excavation of that waterway
should new circumstances emerge. 103
C.

Benefits and Burdens of Static Regulation

Despite the uncertainty faced by lawmakers, static law affords
many benefits. Across a suite of circumstances, it may constitute
optimal policy.
First, static law entrenches values that society deems to be
important. Where a value is of weight, uncertainty about the
consequences of protecting that value may be irrelevant. In other words,
static law can serve a mast-tying function, committing society to a
particular legal course irrespective of new information or circumstances,
and in so doing, static law sends a strong signal about the importance of
the values it protects. Lawmakers can, of course, later revisit and modify
a static law. Because of institutional, legal, and political barriers,
however, such reconsideration is often difficult, particularly where the
norms embodied in a static law have successfully shaped cultural values.
Consider the legal prohibition on torture again. 104 By committing
to that prohibition, notwithstanding its uncertain effects, Congress
reinforced the cultural norm against torture. The effects are apparent. In
the wake of 9/11, the President could have asked Congress to modify the
law to permit torture in certain circumstances where, for example, an
imminent threat to national security existed. 105 Some scholars have
argued that such legislation may even have garnered popular support. 106
Instead, the Administration attempted to work within the existing
framework by labeling coercive interrogation techniques such as
waterboarding as something other than torture, an effort that itself has
been the subject of significant controversy. 107 Because the ban on torture
102 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
162 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012)).
103 The regulations governing the section 404(a) program are set forth in 33 C.F.R. §§ 320–
338 (2015).
104 See David Luban, Essay, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425,
1439 (2005).
105 Cf. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No exceptional circumstances
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”).
106 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 275, 277 (2004).
107 See, e.g., Christopher Kutz, Essay, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L.
REV. 235, 240 (2007). To be clear, the point is not that the Administration’s effort to define
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was crafted as static law, it established a relatively fixed terrain across
which later debates about interrogation occurred. 108
Similarly, constitutional rules have moral force, in part because of
their static nature. The First Amendment, for example, was adopted
against a backdrop of uncertainty. The drafters of the Amendment
could only speculate about the importance of facilitating a market place
of ideas and innovation, or the balance between the benefits of
protecting speech and the costs to individual or government interests.
Two hundred years later, these issues remain a subject of spirited
debate. 109 Nonetheless, the First Amendment created a strong cultural
and legal signal about the social value of protecting speech, and that rule
has remained unchanged. 110
Second, in many cases, static law saves resources. It may
accomplish this by eliminating legal uncertainty—even as it fails to
account for factual uncertainty—and providing a predictable framework
within which regulated parties can operate. In so doing, static law may
achieve socially optimal outcomes even in circumstances where the
adopted rule is not itself optimal. This will be true when the costs—both
economic and otherwise—associated with modifying a legal rule
waterboarding as something other than torture was successful. The United States government
has itself previously viewed the practices as constituting torture. See Luke Whelan, New
Documents Show the US Called Waterboarding Torture During World War II, MOTHER JONES
(Dec. 17, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/12/waterboardingtorture-japan-world-war-ii. Rather, the static law structure of anti-torture law created a baseline
against which the Administration acted in trying to justify its practices.
108 The Endangered Species Act’s (ESA) prohibition on the taking of endangered species
constitutes another example of static law’s role in inculcating and enforcing norms. See
Endangered Species Act of 1973, sec. 9, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012)). Section 9 of the Act embodied a social value that
human activity should not extinguish other forms of life. The rule was written in absolute
terms, and early in the statute’s life, the Supreme Court explained that “Congress has spoken in
the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of
affording endangered species the highest of priorities.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
194 (1978). Although Congress also enacted section 10 of the ESA to allow certain takings of
endangered species, preserving species from extinction remains a popular and important
policy. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT POLL 2 (2011), http://ht.ly/4appW.
109 For example, both the legality and propriety of criminalizing revenge pornography—the
act of distributing graphic sexual images of someone without their consent—has been a recent
subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression:
Legislative Pushback to an Online Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 700–01 (2014); Danielle K. Citron & Mary A.
Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 347–49 (2014); Ian Farrell et
al., Colorado’s New Revenge Porn Statute is Good Law and Sound Policy, HUFFINGTON POST:
BLOG (June 1, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-farrell/colorados-newrevenge-por_b_5427703.html.
110 This is, of course, an oversimplification, as legal doctrine surrounding the First
Amendment has evolved through judicial decisions. Compare, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343 (2003) (upholding a Virginia statute criminalizing cross burning), with R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a St. Paul, Minnesota hate crime ordinance).
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outweigh the benefits that accrue from better tailoring that rule to
changing circumstances or new information. 111 The costs avoided by
static law take two forms. Fixed rules reduce the risks of investment.
This is a central benefit of the rule of law. A nation with a stable and
certain set of legal rules will attract foreign investment and investors will
demand lower interest rates. 112 In other words, the very act of creating
static law has salutary effects to the extent that those affected by the
regulation believe in the stability of the regime, at least during the
period relevant to an investment decision. 113 People make investments
based on existing legal rules, and static law honors these investments
with future certainty. 114 Static law also avoids costs of transitioning
between legal regimes. When rules change, those affected must change
their behavior in response. Depending on the magnitude of the change,
this can itself impose substantial costs. 115
Consider again the example of the rule requiring drivers to travel
on the right side of the road. Unlike the First Amendment and the
Convention Against Torture, 116 no normative commitment adheres to
this rule, and as discussed, evidence suggests that the United States
follows the worse rule because driving on the right side correlates with a
greater number of accidents. 117 Nonetheless, relying on static law to
establish the right-side driving rule also created significant benefits. For
example, choosing a uniform and certain standard may have facilitated

111 By using the language of costs and benefits, I do not mean to invoke purely economic
cost-benefit analysis of the type critiqued by scholars such as Lisa Heinzerling and Frank
Ackerman. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 207–08 (2004); Frank Ackerman & Lisa
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 1553, 1558–60 (2002). There are circumstances where a traditional economic analysis
would indicate that stable but poorly calibrated legal rules will outperform those that are more
flexible and responsive. Indeed, traditional economics might overvalue stability because
dynamic law will often benefit environmental values that are difficult to monetize. Id.
112 See Gaëtan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic
Environmental Policies: Striking a “Reasonable” Balance Between Stability and Change, 29 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 451, 453 (1998).
113 Static law may also reduce investment in lobbying for modification of an existing legal
rule because achieving such modification is substantially more difficult that adjusting dynamic
law. Economic and social capital that might be expended in seeking such a change can thus be
put to other productive uses.
114 Investment under existing legal rules also serves to generate de facto static law because
rules that have engendered substantial investment become politically harder to change. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Essay, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1218–20
(2001).
115 See Gubler, supra note 12, at 139 (“Laws may become entrenched because the more
people that rely on them, the more valuable they become and the less likely they are to be
displaced, even by a potentially superior law.”).
116 See discussion supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
117 See LEEMING, supra note 38.
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the spread of the automobile. 118 It may have encouraged car companies
to invest substantial resources in designing and building cars, confident
that these cars would not suddenly become obsolete. It also may have
facilitated purchasing decisions by individuals and companies because
they could be confident that their investment would not suddenly
become functionally useless. The benefits of selecting a fixed rule—
driving on the right-hand side of the road—likely outweigh the costs of
the small uptick in traffic accidents associated with that rule. Moreover,
switching rules would likely incur substantial transitional costs.
Companies would have to redesign models and production facilities,
and individuals would have to abandon existing vehicles in favor of new
ones. Moreover, during the transition period, road accidents would
likely increase as people grew accustomed to the new regime.
Third, static law can create incentives for private market actors to
engage in pro-social conduct. This is illustrated by many of the so-called
“command-and-control” approaches to environmental law. 119 By
instantiating a legal rule with firm application, the government
encourages regulated parties to channel energy and resources to
developing means of conforming to that rule. This is just what occurred
when Congress banned chlorofluorocarbons through the Clean Air Act
amendments of 1990. 120 Congress faced considerable uncertainty about
the economic repercussions of a ban, but nonetheless adopted a
stringent and specific timetable for eliminating these substances that
deplete the ozone layer. 121 Industry responded by developing
commercially viable alternatives. 122
118 It is not impossible, however, to change which side of the road drivers use. In 2009, the
island nation of Samoa did just that. See Vanderbilt, supra note 89. That decision was not
motivated by concern for public safety. Rather, Samoa believed that it could import cars more
cheaply from Australia and New Zealand, which require driving on the left, than from
countries that drive on the right. Id.
119 I have not identified an agreed upon term in the literature to describe non-adaptive
decision-making and have selected “static law” because it captures a primary axis along which it
diverges from adaptive management. The command-and-control “approach typically proceeds
by imposing rigid standards of conduct on individual pollution sources . . . backed up by
sanctions designed to assure full compliance with such standards by each source.” James E.
Krier & Richard B. Stewart, Using Economic Analysis in Teaching Environmental Law: The
Example of Common Law Rules, 1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 13, 15 n.3 (1980).
120 Clean Air Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012)).
121 See id. (codified as amended at § 7407); see also Clare Langley-Hawthorne, An
International Market for Transferable Gas Emission Permits to Promote Climate Change, 9
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 261, 276–77 (1998) (identifying a concern about the uncertainty of
economic effects of ozone depletion and development of alternative technologies).
122 See Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly
Remarkable, and Remarkably Particular, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 59 (2001). Title VI
of the Clean Air Act was the United States’ means of accomplishing the goals established in the
Montreal Protocol. See tit. VI, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended §§ 7671–7671q).
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Fourth, static law reduces the burden of governing. Lawmakers
face abundant demands for their attention. Static law reduces these
demands because it allows lawmakers to address problems only once.
This benefit may be particularly acute in the context of politically
charged, divisive decisions. In such circumstances, a lawmaking body
may take significant time to overcome political opposition. Deciding
once, rather than in an iterative fashion, may be the only realistic means
of addressing a problem in such circumstances.
Administrative agencies face similar political and resource
constraints. The Administrative Procedure Act, for example, imposes
process requirements on agency decisions that can consume substantial
resources. 123 Where applicable, the National Environmental Policy Act
and the Endangered Species Act also impose resource intensive
procedural requirements. 124 The cost to agencies associated with
creating dynamic law may, in some circumstances, outweigh the
benefits of creating a legal regime responsive to new information.
The primary drawback of static law is encapsulated in its name.
Static law is static. It lacks nimbleness and flexibility, and may be
particularly unsuited to governing complex and chaotic situations.
Where lawmakers deploy static law to govern such circumstances,
standards, programs, and other legal interventions may become
outdated but nonetheless persist because of the difficulty of changing
static law once it is created. These changes in circumstances may arise
because of new information, new technologies, or as Hannah Wiseman
has explained, because the scale of a regulated activity has increased. 125
Even when lawmakers agree that a static law regime needs to be
amended—or abandoned altogether—it may nonetheless persist because
lawmakers lack the resources or attention to address the matter. 126
Reliance on outdated laws is not only ineffective, but also undermines
the public’s faith in their government. 127
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
125 Wiseman, supra note 28, at 238. As Brigham Daniels has explained, “institutions built to
address yesterday’s problems become today’s obstacles to change.” Brigham Daniels, Emerging
Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 522 (2007). Daniels examines a particular
regulatory context—managing common resources—and explains that the desire for stable
institutions to govern such resources can create what he terms “tragic institutions,” which
burden future efforts to manage those resources in light of changing values or new information.
See id. at 539.
126 Wiseman, supra note 28, at 272.
127 Moreover, the difficulty of modifying static law may mean that change will occur only in
the wake of extreme circumstances. Cf. id. at 241 (noting that the “regulatory lag” associated
with unconventional oil and gas development “partially results from the tendency of
policymakers, agencies, and stakeholders to rely upon dramatic incidents and major
technological modifications . . . as triggers of needed regulatory change”). Following dramatic
123
124
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Static law may also be ill-suited to the problems faced in mature
regulatory contexts. When lawmakers first turn their attention to a set
of problems (e.g., environmental problems), static law may achieve
considerable success. J.B. Ruhl made this observation in reference to
command-and-control mechanisms, which generally constitute static
law rules that govern the discharge of pollution: the first generation of
environmental regulation achieved success by “pick[ing] the lowhanging fruit . . . . [F]or example, it has targeted emissions from
smokestacks and discharge pipes, disposal of wastes in landfills,
transportation of hazardous chemicals, and similar discrete, easilyidentified sources of environmental harm.” 128 Ruhl suggested that static
law poorly addresses the thornier problems that remain. This same
observation applies to other contexts. Lawmakers sensibly begin with
those problems that are easiest to address, and such problems may lend
themselves to static law solutions. After more than two centuries of
governance, American law may have solved many such problems, and
what remains may require the dynamic approaches discussed in the next
Part.
III. DYNAMIC LAW
Static legal rules, sensible when enacted, may become out of date,
outliving their usefulness. Even unconstitutional laws remain on the
books long after they become unenforceable. 129 Even popular culture
understands that laws may persist too long. In the hit television show
Parks and Recreation, the town of Pawnee, Indiana has an obviously
unconstitutional law governing city council elections. On the eve of
such an election, the lead character is told by a voting official that “[a]
final tally [of votes] within one percent will trigger an automatic
recount. In the event of an exact tie, the seat is awarded to the male
candidate and the female candidate is put in jail.” 130 The official

and vivid regulatory failure, the government may feel pressure to act quickly to change existing
programs. But such rushed action will itself often lack nuance.
128 J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is it Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
21, 21 (2005) [hereinafter Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management].
129 See, e.g., William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the
Revival of “Unconstitutional” Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1907 (1993); Hillary Greene,
Note, Undead Laws: The Use of Historically Unenforced Criminal Statutes in Non-Criminal
Litigation, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174 (1997); Brian Palmer, How a Bill Becomes Not a
Law: What Happens to Unconstitutional State Laws? Can They Just Stay on the Books Forever?,
SLATE (Apr. 4, 2013, 3:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/
2013/04/north_carolina_state_religion_bill_does_unconstitutional_legislation_disappear.html.
130 Parks and Recreation: Win, Lose, or Draw (NBC television broadcast May 10, 2012).
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acknowledges, “I don’t think it would hold up in court, but it is city
law.” 131 This fictional account mirrors reality. Static law sticks around. 132
Permanence has advantages. So too does flexibility and dynamism.
Dynamic law enables lawmakers to craft regulatory interventions to
respond to new information and shifting conditions.
This Part provides an account of mechanisms by which legal rules
can respond to new information, identifying three primary modes of
dynamic law. First, durational regulation promotes whole-cloth
amendment and reconsideration of law after it is adopted by creating
periodic opportunities for review. 133 It achieves this end without
creating specialized procedural rules that are calibrated to emerging
information. Rather, durational regulation creates open-ended
opportunities for the amendment and repeal of existing rules. Second,
adaptive regulation creates a process that is internal to a legal
framework and allows for reconsideration of that framework’s rules. 134
This reconsideration could occur, and perhaps ideally would occur, by a
subsidiary body specially charged with managing the legal regime. It
may also occur by the initial lawmaking body itself. Third, contingent
regulation eschews process-based approaches to dynamism, and instead
incorporates mechanisms that provide for automatic substantive
changes to legal rules based on foreseeable future conditions. 135
From a theoretical perspective, this typology recognizes that law
can respond to uncertainty either internally or externally. In other
words, a legal regime can itself include mechanisms by which the rules
attendant to that regime can change—the internal approach of adaptive
regulation and contingent regulation—or a legal regime can include
mechanisms that encourage lawmakers to amend or replace that
regime—the external approach of durational regulation. Where a
dynamic law regime includes internal mechanisms for change, those
mechanisms may be procedural or substantive in nature. In other
words, dynamism can include specific, substantive adjustments to
governing legal rules if certain events come to pass—contingent
regulation—or it can specify procedures for developing such
adjustments—adaptive regulation.
Each approach—internal and external, procedural and
substantive—has advantages. This Part examines each mechanism in
turn.

131
132
133
134
135

Id.
See sources cited supra note 129.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
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Durational Regulation

Durational regulation addresses uncertainty by facilitating periodic
opportunities for the amendment or repeal of existing rules. The
underlying legal rules may resemble static law. Durational regulation
contains no specialized set of procedures to govern the modification of
rules. Rather, lawmakers that promulgate durational regulation can
intervene in response to new information or changing circumstances,
and durational regulation facilitates that intervention. In other words,
unlike static law, which is intended to remain a permanent fixture in the
architecture of the legal system, durational regulation is intended only
for temporary or durational use. 136
1.

The Structure of Durational Regulation

Durational regulation involves the open-ended reconsideration,
revision, or repeal of existing rules by lawmakers to address new
information and emerging circumstances. Such a process differs from
adaptive regulation because it involves no predefined procedures by
which new information would trigger reconsideration, and it differs
from contingent regulation because it involves no pre-commitment as
to the substance of future changes in a legal rule. Instead, lawmakers
simply make new decisions as new decisions become desirable, in
consideration of any information they believe is relevant. The problem,
of course, is that making decisions in a democracy is difficult and time
consuming, in no small part because lawmakers face nearly endless
demands on their time and attention. Durational regulation seeks to
overcome those barriers. Sometimes it accomplishes that task by
reducing the difficulty of decision-making, either by relaxing legal
constraints or by creating periodic opportunities for lawmakers to
reconsider rules should they so desire. Other times durational regulation
creates significant incentives for lawmakers to revisit existing rules—
incentives designed to counteract barriers to decision-making. 137 To the
challenge of uncertainty, durational regulation answers: if relevant
information emerges in the future, lawmakers should intervene to
consider any information they deem appropriate, and should take any
steps they deem necessary.

136 The term “durational regulation” draws its origin from the original term “duration
clause,” which, in one of its more common forms, is included in sunset provisions. For a
discussion of duration clauses, see Gersen, supra note 20, at 248.
137 See infra notes 145–66 and accompanying text.
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Durational regulation can function by reducing obstacles to
decision-making by relaxing legal constraints on the decision-making
process, including constraints imposed by process rules. Such relaxation
decreases the cost to lawmakers of revisiting their decisions, thus
making amendment or repeal more likely. Durational regulation can
also function by requiring lawmakers to convene at specified times to
discuss any changes to a legal rule that may be required. Such
opportunities place amendment or repeal on the agenda, which helps to
overcome the inertia that can arise from the multifarious obligations
facing government actors.
Alternatively, durational regulation can leave in place the existing
architecture by which reconsideration of law occurs, and instead can
create incentives for lawmakers to overcome the barriers they face. A
longstanding mechanism for creating such incentives is the practice of
establishing deadlines by which existing legal rules must be revisited,
and which create either real-world or political consequences for
inaction. Deadlines can be hard or soft, depending on the consequences
that would occur if a deadline is missed.
Sunset provisions create a form of “penalty default” for lawmakers
by imposing hard deadlines by which lawmakers must revisit decisions
before earlier decisions expire on their own terms. 138 Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner originally conceived of penalty defaults in the context of
default rules for contracts—rules that neither party to a contract would
prefer to be bound by—thereby “giv[ing] at least one party to the
contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore
to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.” 139 Sunset
provisions operate similarly by creating a default regime in which the
absence of further lawmaking causes a legal rule to disappear entirely.
Assuming that lawmakers believe legal rules serve important purposes,
138 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 20, at 253; Wiseman, supra note 28, at 272. Not every
provision terminating a legal rule after a certain period of time constitutes durational
regulation. Sometimes, a temporary legal intervention is all that is required to address a
problem. At other times, a temporary intervention may have different, desirable consequences
when compared to a permanent intervention. For example, there is evidence that a temporary
reduction in taxes for stock dividends that are distributed to shareholders may boost the size of
dividend distributions more than a permanent tax cut. See Steven A. Bank, Dividends and Tax
Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 536 (2007). In such circumstances, the
temporary nature of a legal rule is not serving the purpose of facilitating reconsideration, and as
such, the rule does not constitute durational regulation as the term is used in this Article.
139 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). Penalty defaults are not a perfect analogy for
durational regulation. Durational regulation creates incentives for decision-making at a later
date in order to reveal the preferences of lawmakers at that time based on information that was
unavailable at the moment that a legal rule was initially created. Penalty defaults in contract
law, on the other hand, promote additional decision-making at the inception of a contract on
the basis of information already in the possession of at least one of the parties.
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sunset provisions impose real costs for failure to act, and therefore
create positive incentives—which are sometimes substantial—for
decision-making to occur before an important legal rule expires.
Deadlines can also be softer in nature, decoupled from the realworld consequences of automatic rule termination, and instead can
involve a commitment to make a decision by a certain time, thereby
imposing a political cost for failure to act. For example, a statute may
require an administrative agency to reconsider an earlier decision within
a set number of years. 140 These statutory deadlines “are usually deemed
directory,” rather than mandatory. 141 In circumstances where an
agency’s violation of a statutory deadline becomes extreme, the
Administrative Procedure Act provides a backstop by allowing affected
parties to sue an agency that has “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed” action. 142 Even unenforceable deadlines, however, serve a
function. They create political and public pressure for action.
Not all deadlines constitute durational regulation. The purpose of
durational regulation, like other forms of dynamic law, is to make law
responsive to emerging information. Lawmakers may deploy deadlines
for other purposes. The “fiscal cliff” of 2013 is one example. 143 In 2011,
Congress increased the borrowing authority of the United States to
avoid a government default on federal loans, but it proved unable to
agree to a package of spending cuts and tax increases necessary to avoid
the need for further borrowing. 144 Instead, Congress enacted the Budget
Control Act, which included automatic, across-the-board budget cuts to

140 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (b)(1)(B) (2012) (“The Administrator shall, at least every 8
years, review and, if appropriate, revise such standards [of performance for new stationary
sources (buildings, structures, facilities, or installations) of air pollutants] . . . .”).
141 Trans Fleet Enters., Inc. v. Boone, 987 F.2d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Even statutory
time limits for agency action are usually deemed directory.”); see CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 33 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 8387 (1st ed. 2015) (“Review of
delay takes on the search for negligent omission or reckless disregard of the administrative
duty.”).
142 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). Environmental plaintiffs have enjoyed significant success in
suing for violations of statutory deadlines contained in the Endangered Species Act, perhaps in
part because the deadlines are so short and the courts provide the relevant agencies relatively
little wiggle room. See generally Benjamin Jesup, Endless War or End This War? The History of
Deadline Litigation Under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act and the Multi-District
Litigation Settlements, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 327 (2013) (recounting the history of deadline suits
under the Endangered Species Act).
143 See Lori Montgomery & Rosalind S. Helderman, Congress Approves “Fiscal Cliff”
Measure, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
house-members-meet-to-review-senate-passed-cliff-deal/2013/01/01/6e4373cc-5435-11e2-bf3e76c0a789346f_story.html.
144 See Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2068¬69
(2013).
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programs favored by both Democrats and Republicans. 145 Those cuts—
referred to as “sequestration”—were to take effect on January 2, 2013.146
Sequestration resembles the deadlines discussed above, but the purpose
of sequestration differed. Congress designed these spending cuts to
force a political compromise, not to facilitate responsiveness to new
information. 147 Therefore, sequestration did not constitute durational
regulation.
2.

Durational Regulation Across Context

Durational regulation has occurred throughout American law.
Probably the most common form is the sunset provision. This strategy
stretches back as far as the framing of the Constitution. Article I
requires Congress to appropriate money for the military no less than
every two years. 148 In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
explained that the two-year appropriation limit promoted congressional
deliberation: “The Legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this
provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the
propriety of keeping a military force on foot.” 149 In other words, as
Jacob Gersen has explained, the Constitution forces Congress “to
reconsider the need for a standing military, and incorporate
information about changing circumstances into legislative
deliberations.”150
Federal statutes sometimes include similar provisions. Such
“temporary legislation” was common early in American history, but has
become less commonplace. 151 Congress does continue to use sunset
provisions on occasion. For example, the Public Safety and Recreational
Firearms Use Protection Act banned the manufacture and transfer of
assault weapons and included a sunset provision that caused the ban to

145 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); see BILL HENIFF JR. ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 4 (2011) (describing Budget Control
Act’s goal of forcing lawmakers to reach a compromise on spending).
146 125 Stat. 240.
147 See HENIFF, supra note 145.
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to appropriate money “[t]o
raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years”).
149 THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton).
150 See Gersen, supra note 20, at 251.
151 See id.
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expire after a decade. 152 During that decade, Congress directed the
Attorney General to “study the effect” of various provisions of the law,
including the assault weapons ban, and “determine their impact, if any,
on violent and drug trafficking crime.” 153 This legislation provides a
useful illustration of durational regulation. Congress created a means of
generating information about the efficacy of the assault weapons ban
and sought to ensure reconsideration of the ban by means of its
automatic expiration. The assault weapons ban also provides a
cautionary tale about durational regulation. Sometimes, politics gets in
the way, and the impending termination of an important legal regime
fails to actually compel its reconsideration and reauthorization. Rather,
the regime does in fact terminate. 154
Congress also sets deadlines for administrative agencies, although
these provisions typically function as softer deadlines. For example,
section 111 of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to revisit technologybased standards for categories of stationary sources every eight years. 155
Section 111 does not, however, operate as a sunset provision to
automatically terminate the standards after eight years. 156 The deadline
has the effect, however, of creating public, political, and legal pressure
for the EPA to update the standards to account for new information.
Similarly, the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning
Act 157 requires the U.S. Forest Service to issue fifteen-year management
plans for each national forest. 158
Forms of durational regulation other than those that contain
deadlines also exist in practice. The Federal Reserve’s management of
152 Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 110101–110106, 108 Stat. 1796, 2000 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(31), 922(w)
(2000) (repealed 2004)).
153 Id. at § 110104.
154 The assault weapons ban indeed terminated in this manner. See Joel Roberts, Assault
Weapon Ban Expires, CBS NEWS (Sept. 13, 2004, 9:42 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
assault-weapon-ban-expires. The termination of the assault weapons ban could be viewed as a
successful use of dynamic law. If one viewed the results of the Attorney General’s study as
supporting repeal of the ban, then Congress’s failure to reauthorize the ban—either in its
original form or in a form modified by reference to the knowledge generated by the study—
embodies an appropriate change in law based on new information. The entrenched political
dynamics of gun control suggest, however, that information production had less to do with the
expiration of the ban than ideology.
155 Clean Air Act, § 111, 69. Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(b)(1)(B) (2012)) (“The Administrator shall, at least every 8 years, review and, if
appropriate, revise such standards.”); see also Wiseman, supra note 28, at 291–92.
156 See § 7411.
157 Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88
Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (2012)).
158 See § 1604(f)(5). Congress has repeatedly passed laws allowing the Forest Service to
continue to enforce outdated laws. See, e.g., Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568
F.3d 225, 227–28 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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monetary policy is a good example. By statute, the Federal Open Market
Committee, a subdivision of the Federal Reserve, must meet “at least
four times each year.” 159 These prescribed meetings create periodic
opportunities for the Committee to discuss and modify monetary
policy. The ability to make such modification is further facilitated
because the operations of the Committee are largely exempt from
ordinary administrative process requirements, 160 including from typical
avenues of congressional oversight. 161 In other words, a specific
substantive area of law—monetary policy—has been entrusted to a
governing body that is required to meet periodically and whose
decision-making processes are subject to a preferential set of procedural
rules. That body is then charged with establishing and modifying policy
to account for new information and changing circumstances.
International treaty regimes provide a second example. In many
cases, after the enactment of a multilateral treaty, the parties convene
after a specified period at a conference of the parties (or “COP”) at
which any issue affecting the treaty can be discussed and resolved.162
The issues addressed at a COP are far-ranging, and typically the treaties
themselves do not provide an exhaustive list. Rather, the COP creates an
opportunity for the signatories to the treaty to gather and address
emerging issues. 163
Congress’s rules governing deliberation over the federal budget
constitutes a third example. Few decision-making bodies have a
reputation as poor as Congress, and in part that stems from Congress’s
inability to take action. 164 One obstacle to congressional action is the
Senate procedural rule that requires a supermajority vote in order to
pass most legislation. 165 That supermajority rule can result in lengthy
159 See 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) (2012). The current practice of the Committee is to meet eight
times each year. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Open Market
Committee, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2015).
160 See, e.g., Raichle v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 34 F.2d 910, 913–14 (2d Cir. 1929); Steven
M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial
Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 477–78 (2009).
161 See 5 U.S.C. § 807 (2012) (exempting monetary policy from Congressional review).
162 See Annecoos Wiersema, The New International Law-Makers? Conferences of the Parties
to Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 231, 235–36 (2009).
163 See id.
164 See 6% Think Congress Is Doing a Good or Excellent Job, RASMUSSEN REP. (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/mood_of_america_archive/
congressional_performance/6_think_congress_is_doing_a_good_or_excellent_job.
A
Rasmussen poll conducted in July of 2014 reveals both the perception that congress performs
poorly and that a majority of respondents believed that “passing good legislation is a more
important role for Congress than preventing bad legislation from becoming law.” Id.
165 See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of
Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 261, 266 (2013).
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periods of inaction. Delays significantly undermine the benefits of
budgeting, particularly because budgeting involves substantial
uncertainty “on ‘both’ sides of the ledger,” and because both tax
revenues and necessary expenditures may exceed projections. 166
Congress enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 to facilitate budgeting and to make it more responsive to
new information. 167 The Act, among other things, eliminated the
Senate’s supermajority rule when applied to budget resolutions, and
replaced it with a reconciliation process that allowed no more than
twenty hours of debate. 168 In other words, with respect to budgeting,
Congress has reduced the barriers to decision-making.
3.

Benefits and Burdens of Durational Regulation

When lawmakers revisit decisions, they can incorporate emerging
information and address new circumstances. This allows the law to
remain current. Durational regulation nonetheless imposes costs by
requiring lawmakers themselves to take further action.
A few scholars have lauded the potential for durational regulation
to enable legal experimentation, particularly deadline-based durational
regulation. 169 Sunset provisions create a natural trial period for a legal
rule during which additional information about that rule and its context
can be gathered. That approach may have particular utility when
lawmakers enter a new field of regulation, or when they respond to a
new problem. As Jacob Gersen explains, “[b]ecause temporary
legislation reduces background uncertainty and mitigates certain forms
166 David Kamin, Risky Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget, 88 IND. L.J. 723,
731 (2013). The federal government cannot spend more money than appropriated by Congress.
Where emerging events require spending of money in excess of appropriations, Congress
appropriates additional funds through a supplemental appropriations bill. See, e.g., Press
Release, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D–Cal.), U.S. Sen., Feinstein Remarks in Support of
Supplemental Appropriations Bill (July 31, 2014), http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/press-releases?ID=776864e4-fd96-4024-ad06-c86833e749f0.
167 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)).
168 See Jacobi & VanDam, supra note 165, at 292–303.
169 See Gersen, supra note 20, at 253 (arguing that temporary laws provide concrete
advantages over permanent laws from an informational perspective); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting
Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1067 (2011) (criticizing the political and economic costs of
temporary rules, but acknowledging the importance of experimental rules in the face of
emergencies or uncertainty); Romano, supra note 68, at 88. Jessica Owley’s consideration of
“term conservation easements,” which would require easement holders to reconsider terms
after a time interval, identifies similar advantages. See Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a
Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
121 (2011).
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of cognitive bias, it is likely to provide far more advantages than
drawbacks as a legislative response to newly recognized risks.” 170
Moreover, expressly experimental rules may facilitate agreement
because the anticipated cost of complying with a rule for only a short
period of time may be relatively insignificant.
Durational regulation, then, may prove most effective in situations
where uncertainty is at its apex, where the costs of stagnation are high,
and where the costs of change are relatively low. Where an agency has
inadequate information to even identify the likely consequences of a
new legal rule, planning for contingencies at the outset—as contingent
regulation would require—may prove difficult, resource-intensive, or
impossible.
Durational regulation also serves a salutary signaling purpose. One
problem created by static law is that it creates an appearance of
permanence that can mislead regulated parties. Durational regulation
puts regulated parties on notice that applicable legal rules are likely to
change. Notice may lead to more sensible investment decisions or
choices that hedge against the cost of future modifications of legal rules.
Durational regulation is not without flaws, however. Laws tend to
become path-dependent, meaning that temporary rules may become
permanent by default, even where adjustment would be beneficial. 171
The history of the Voting Rights Act may present an example. Section 5
of the Act requires political jurisdictions with a history of
discrimination to seek approval from the Attorney General of the
United States, before altering voting rules. 172 Congress created a formula
to identify those states that would be subject to section 5 and attached a
sunset provision to the formula to facilitate future adjustments. The
formula, however, proved sticky and Congress did not make
adjustments to incorporate new information. For this reason, the
Supreme Court invalidated the provision that contained the formula in
Shelby County v. Holder. 173 Moreover, in some circumstances,
lawmakers may face significant political obstacles to effectively
implementing durational regulation because iterative decision-making
processes provide opportunities for “regulated [entities to] develop[]
lasting contacts and coalitions” designed to thwart future regulatory
efforts. 174
Gersen, supra note 20, at 248.
See Gubler, supra note 12, at 134.
172 Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)). These jurisdictions can, alternatively, file a lawsuit seeking a
declaration approving of the new procedure. Id.
173 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
174 Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the
Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1713 (2008).
170
171
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Durational regulation, particularly deadline-based durational
regulation, also imposes hefty burdens on lawmakers. 175 Those burdens
fall with particular severity on administrative agencies that are required
to comply with resource-consuming processes, such as notice-andcomment rulemaking, and are faced with the prospect of judicial
challenges after each iterated decision. This dynamic produces a
perverse political economy for agencies: Permanent rules consume
fewer resources and limit litigation to a single instance, but such rules
do not account for new information. Temporary rules increase resource
costs and litigation risks, but produce a better legal regime. Zachery
Gubler has proposed a possible solution to this problem, arguing that
courts should provide increased deference to agencies that promulgate
temporary rules, 176 although the textual basis for differing standards of
judicial deference in the Administrative Procedure Act is unclear.
Agency capture may also occur where durational regulation
involves a specialized decision-maker tasked with continuously
updating a particular legal regime. 177 Narrowing an agency’s jurisdiction
to facilitate consistent attention to a particular problem increases the
likelihood that a small group of private parties will be the primary voices
heard by that agency and a primary source of future staff. 178 Such
dynamics may distort decision-making. 179 For example, federal law tasks
Regional Fishery Management Councils with setting annual catch limits,
based on evolving information, to ensure that yields are sustainable. 180
These councils primarily interact with the fishing industry and—

175 Private parties may also face increased burdens, as those interested in durational
regulation will need to deploy resources to advocate on behalf of their interests when a
regulation’s duration has passed. Cf. Owley, supra note 169, at 169 (identifying concern that
term conservation easements may increase transaction costs).
176 Gubler, supra note 12, at 134. Gubler explains that the political economy benefits from
enhanced deference. If time-limited rules have a better chance of surviving judicial review than
permanent rules, interest groups that favor a policy will also favor a time-limited rule. Id. If
interest groups support time-limited rules, that will pressure agencies to pursue such an
approach. Id.
177 Agency capture refers to the ability of interest groups to coopt agency decision-making
processes. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22–23 (2010); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust
Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724–25 (1986).
178 See Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 4 (2010).
179 Cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (“[S]pecialization will produce a court with tunnel vision, with judges
who are overly sympathetic to the policies furthered by the law that they administer or who are
susceptible to ‘capture’ by the bar that regular[ly] practices before them.”).
180 See 16 U.S.C. § 1852 (2012); see generally Roger Fleming et al., Twenty-Eight Years and
Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on Its Conservation Promise?, 28 VT. L. REV.
579 (2004).
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consistent with similar concerns about agency capture—have been
criticized for inadequately protecting fish stocks. 181
In some circumstances, durational regulation strategies may face
political difficulties because they can appear costlier than permanent
rules when reviewed under current accounting practices. In considering
legislative sunset provisions, George Yin explains that the method of
projecting budgetary impact of any proposed legislation systematically
disadvantages time-limited laws. 182 This effect occurs because the cost of
permanent legislation is assessed over a “budget window period,” which
is typically five or ten fiscal years, and budget analyses ignore all costs
after that window. 183 This artificially reduces the perceived cost of
permanent legislation as compared to temporary legislation. 184 This is
not a theoretical flaw with durational regulation, but is rather a practical
difficulty facing lawmakers who are seeking to implement this
strategy. 185

B.

Adaptive Regulation

Like durational regulation, adaptive regulation facilitates
reconsideration of legal rules. Adaptive regulation has been popularized
by the glut of adaptive management programs that have been
incorporated into environmental and natural resources law. It
incorporates specialized procedures that require reconsideration of legal
rules in response to new information or changing circumstances.
1.

The Structure of Adaptive Regulation

Adaptive regulation creates procedures within a legal framework
that require reconsideration of the substantive rules. This is
accomplished as follows: Lawmakers create a legal rule and attach a
process to that rule by which reconsideration will occur as new
information becomes available. During such reconsideration, the legal
rule can be modified in whatever way is deemed appropriate. Adaptive
181 See JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCILS 27–28 (2003); Katrina Mariam Wyman, from Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the
Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 180 (2005); Fleming, supra 180, at 613.
182 George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 186–87 (2009).
183 Id. at 178.
184 Id. at 180.
185 Even in the absence of this accounting-based distortion, the application of a discount rate
could complicate economic comparison between durational regulation and static law.
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regulation may rely on either the initial lawmakers, or another
subsidiary body, to engage in the process of reconsidering legal rules.
Adaptive regulation is “an iterative, incremental decisionmaking
process built around a continuous process of monitoring the effects of
decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.” 186 To the challenge of
uncertainty, adaptive regulation answers: if relevant information
emerges in the future, procedures will require consideration of that
information and an appropriate response.
This model of dynamic law is purely procedural in nature. Scholars
of adaptive management—the most prevalent form of adaptive
regulation—even dispute whether adaptive regulation should pursue
specified goals, or whether the goals of regulation should instead emerge
and change through the iterative process of defining the contours of the
legal regime. 187 In other words, adaptive regulation does not pursue
ideal governance at the outset, and lawmakers need not—and should
not—pre-commit to specific substantive changes to a law in the event of
either foreseen or unforeseen future occurrences. Rather, the premise of
adaptive regulation is that accounting for new information is better
done over time. Adaptive regulation encompasses a range of regulatory
approaches, including, at one extreme, a grant of broad discretion for
lawmakers to revisit and modify a legal rule when new information is
identified, and at the other, a set of highly structured provisions
governing when and how reconsideration must occur. Adaptive
regulation, then, attempts to create a system that can improve with
experience. 188
186 Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 28; see also Notice of
Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and
Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242-01, 35,252 (June 1, 2000) (“Adaptive
management is an integrated method for addressing uncertainty in natural resource
management. It also refers to a structured process for learning by doing.” (citations omitted));
Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1464 (“[A]ny
adaptive strategy must include at least two key features: iterative decisionmaking and a
commitment to learning over time.”).
187 Compare Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at
1469 (emphasizing “the need for clear goals set exogenously to the adaptive management
process”), with NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
FOR WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING 24 (2004) (listing elements of adaptive
management as including “[m]anagement objectives that are regularly revisited and
accordingly revised” by participating stakeholders).
188 The Fish and Wildlife Service has identified the following key elements of an adaptive
management strategy:

(1) identify the uncertainty and the questions that need to be addressed to resolve the
uncertainty; (2) develop alternative strategies and determine which experimental
strategies to implement; (3) integrate a monitoring program that is able to detect the
necessary information for strategy evaluation; and (4) incorporate feedback loops
that link implementation and monitoring to a decision-making process (which may
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Scholars and lawmakers have developed the concept of adaptive
management—the most mature form of adaptive regulation—out of a
desire to have legal regimes reflect the chaotic, turbulent perturbations
that exist in the natural world. 189 J.B. Ruhl has stated this view
eloquently in his advocacy for adaptive management. Ruhl argues that
“[t]o manage the impact of human society on the inherently chaotic,
adaptive environment, the environmental law system itself must possess
those dynamical qualities.” 190 Just as caterpillars evolve over the
generations to become resistant to defensive toxins produced by the
plants they eat, 191 adaptive regulation evolves with the generation of new
information about environmental conditions and effective strategies for
mitigating the negative effects of human activity. This is often
accomplished through hefty reliance on public participation based on
models of new governance. 192 Such efforts are intended to enhance
ecological learning, build trust between stakeholders, better broadcast
the results of monitoring, and ensure that evolution in management
occurs. 193 These public participation processes, however, while central
to many proposals for adaptive management, are not necessarily
inherent in adaptive regulation itself.
More than other forms of dynamic law, adaptive regulation may be
designed not only to respond to new information, but also to generate
that information. As a Department of the Interior report explains, “[a]
distinguishing feature [of adaptive management] is the use of
management interventions as experimental treatments, the fundamental
goal of which is to improve management.” 194 This is particularly true for

be similar to a dispute-resolution process) that result in appropriate changes in
management.
Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35,252; see also J.B. Ruhl,
General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With
Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (2011) [hereinafter
Ruhl, Resilience and Adaptive Capacity].
189 See Tarlock, supra note 49, at 1128–29.
190 Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 51, at 940.
191 See John Smiley, Plant Chemistry and the Evolution of Host Specificity: New Evidence
from Heliconius and Passiflora, 201 SCIENCE 745, 745 (1978).
192 See, e.g., Maria E. Fernandez-Gimenez et al., Adaptive Management and Social Learning
in Collaborative and Community-Based Monitoring: A Study of Five Community-Based Forestry
Organizations in the Western USA, 13 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, art. 4, at 9 (2008),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss2/art4.
193 See id.
194 BYRON K. WILLIAMS & ELEANOR D. BROWN, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MGMT.
WORKING GRP., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
APPLICATIONS GUIDE v (2012), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/ppa/upload/
DOI-Adapative-Management-Applications-Guide.pdf.
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what is termed “active” adaptive management. 195 Active adaptive
management treats the project of governance as an experiment, tasking
lawmakers with developing multiple regulatory treatments for testing to
be used simultaneously. For example, a state agency attempting to
reduce nonpoint source water pollution from road construction projects
might require silt fences along one stream, a vegetative buffer along
another, and a storm water management system along a third. Over
time, the agency would assess the efficacy of each management regime
and use comparative information to formulate new policies. The
agency’s process would not be crabbed by any front-end limitations.
The agency could allow each treatment to persist, make modifications to
the treatment, or abandon it altogether—as deemed appropriate. While
active adaptive management is, perhaps, ideally suited to developing a
richer understanding of regulatory interventions, it has rarely been
implemented in practice because it requires a careful and resourceconsuming process of formulating policy alternatives and implementing
them in such a way so as to produce useable information. 196 Moreover,
where the consequences of poor management decisions are significant,
experimentation may lead to undesirable, high-profile failures. 197
Compare two hypothetical agencies attempting to preserve an
endangered species. The first implements a single management regime
that fails, leading to the species’ extinction. The second implements
three approaches, two of which fail, leading to a two-thirds decline of
the population. The latter agency may actually be subject to greater
criticism than the first. The fact that one policy intervention worked
may suggest to the public that the agency should have known how to
preserve the species, but decided to experiment with other, inferior
policies.
Adaptive regulation is an enticing concept, particularly to those
with a scientific frame of mind. The scientific method emphasizes
experimentation to confirm or disprove hypotheses. From existing
observations and information, the scientist develops a hypothesis. This
hypothesis is then tested through experimentation and the new
information that is generated is then used to refine (or even abandon)
the initial hypothesis, setting the stage for a further round of

195 See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1465–
66; see also Biber, supra note 11, at 938.
196 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 441.
197 See Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242-01, 35,252
(June 1, 2000) (“[A]n active approach may pose too much of a risk to the species . . . [and] may
also be too cumbersome.”).
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experimentation. 198 In the world of science, developing and refining
hypotheses may be the intellectually challenging part of the process, but
experimentation consumes the majority of resources.
So the scientist wants government to be: Agencies should develop a
hypothesis about how a regulatory tool will achieve a desired outcome.
This hypothesis should then be tested in the real world through
regulatory action; and the agency should refine or abandon the
hypothesis based on new information, and develop a new or refined
regulatory approach. The trouble is that, unlike a scientific laboratory,
the decision by a government agency to adopt a particular hypothesis
and implement a particular “experiment” is what consumes significant
time and resources. Making decisions requires significant effort;
agencies must engage with regulated communities and the broader
public, must conduct any necessary environmental review, must
compile a record that supports the decision, must proceed through the
stages of decision-making that have been established by the
Administrative Procedure Act, and must eventually deploy the legal
resources that are necessary to address any legal challenges. In some
sense, this contrast highlights the difference between despotic
government and democratic government. The principle investigator in a
lab has the dictatorial authority to make a specific decision as she deems
appropriate. However, agencies must proceed in accordance with
democratic principles. The calculus of legislative bodies is similar.
Adaptive management has become the dominant model for
managing natural resources problems. It has become so central to the
thinking of scholars in the field that it is imported whole cloth into
other innovations in the field. For example, one definition of ecosystem
management—which at its core suggests that management of natural
resources should occur at an ecosystem level because of
interconnections among natural constituencies—defines it as
“management driven by explicit goals, executed by policies, protocols,
and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring and research based on
our best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes
necessary to sustain ecosystem composition, structure, and function.”199
So too does the influential exposition of ecosystem management by R.
Edward Grumbine, which identifies adaptive management as a core
198 See Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers
of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1579 (2000).
199 Kalyani Robbins, An Ecosystem Management Primer: History, Perceptions, and Modern
Definitions, in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT LAW & POLICY 9 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013) (quoting Norman L. Christensen,
The Report of the Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem
Management, 6 Ecological Applications 665 (1996)).
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component of ecosystem management. 200 Kalyani Robbins similarly
explains that “[i]n implementing ecosystem management, arguably the
most core universally expected element is adaptive management.” 201 She
further describes adaptive management as “a completely indispensable
component” of ecosystem management. 202 The definition suffers from
over-determination. Ecosystem management does not require adaptive
management. Understandings of ecosystems are uncertain and in flux,
and policy should account for that. But law can account for uncertainty
in multiple ways, not just through adaptive management.
The reflexive turn to adaptive regulation when uncertainty arises,
particularly in the guise of adaptive management, may be problematic.
That does not undercut, however, the importance of this policy option
in certain circumstances.
2.

Adaptive Regulation Across Context

As has been explained, adaptive regulation is ubiquitous in natural
resources law. The Department of Interior, which houses the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Land Management, and National Park
Service has an adaptive management working group, 203 and each
component has incorporated adaptive management into site-specific
management decisions. 204 The U.S. Forest Service similarly views
adaptive management as a key component of its decision-making
process, 205 and adaptive management has played an important role in
the management of oceanic fisheries. 206
See id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
202 Id.
203 See, e.g., GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS (2005).
204 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FIRE PLANNING
HANDBOOK H-9211-1 6-1 (2012), http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/Information_
Resources_Management/policy/blm_handbook.Par.4265.File.dat/FINAL_H-9211-1_
transmittal%20sheet.pdf; BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF
DECISION & APPROVED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR CLEAR CREEK MANAGEMENT AREA
22 (2014) [hereinafter BLM, CLEAR CREEK MANAGEMENT AREA], http://www.blm.gov/style/
medialib/blm/ca/pdf/hollister/planning.Par.27928.File.dat/CCMA_ROD_2014_final_with_
cover508.pdf; FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LEARNING TO MANAGE A COMPLEX
ECOSYSTEM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AND THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN (George H. Stankey
et al. eds., 2006), http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_rp567.pdf; Camacho, supra note 19, at
302–03; Winter Use Adaptive Management Program, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/
yell/parkmgmt/wuamp.htm (last visited July 22, 2015).
205 See FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING HANDBOOK:
CHAPTER 40—KEY PROCESSES SUPPORTING LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING (2013 ),
http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5409879.pdf.
206 See PAC. FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., GROUNDFISH
200
201
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In some instances, lawmakers command that adaptive
management should be used, but then provide little specific guidance as
to what goals should be pursued, what information should be collected,
or how that information should affect future decisions. In 2009,
President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order addressing the
restoration of the Chesapeake Bay, which required the development of a
strategy “for coordinated implementation of existing programs and
projects to guide efforts to protect and restore the Chesapeake Bay” and
to include “a process for the implementation of adaptive management
principles, including a periodic evaluation of protection and restoration
activities.” 207 The Order further required the EPA to “identify pollution
control strategies and actions authorized by the EPA’s existing
authorities to restore the Chesapeake Bay that . . . are based on sound
science and reflect adaptive management principles . . . .” 208 But the
Executive Order provides little guidance as to how the EPA is to
accomplish these tasks.
Many agencies provide more detailed adaptive management
programs, identifying triggering events that will initiate the process of
reconsidering applicable legal rules. For example, the Fish and Wildlife
Service produced a “conservation strategy” for grizzly bear populations
to support its 2007 decision to remove certain populations from the
endangered species list. 209 The delisting decision explains that
“[r]ecovery of a species is a dynamic process requiring adaptive
management . . . that may, or may not, fully follow the guidance
provided in a recovery plan.” 210 The strategy specifies that “[t]he best
way to ensure a healthy population of grizzly bears is to monitor both
population and habitat parameters closely and respond when necessary
with adaptive management addressing the problems of the population
in a dynamic way. That is what this [c]onservation [s]trategy is designed
to accomplish.” 211 The strategy further identifies specific situations in
which adaptive management would be utilized. The strategy creates a
taskforce responsible for monitoring the grizzly bear population and
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT 20 (TRAWL RATIONALIZATION) E-2 (2010), http://
www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/PCGFFMP_A20_AsApproved.pdf.
207 Exec. Order No. 13508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23099, 23100 (May 12, 2009).
208 Id. at 23101.
209 Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears from the
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,866-01 (Mar. 29, 2007)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); INTERAGENCY CONSERVATION STRATEGY TEAM, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE GRIZZLY BEAR IN THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE AREA 31 (2007) [hereinafter USFWS, GRIZZLY STRATEGY], http://www.fws.gov/
mountain-prairie/species/mammals/grizzly/ConservationStrategygrizzlybearGYA.pdf.
210 Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears from the
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. at 14,869.
211 USFWS, GRIZZLY STRATEGY, supra note 209, at 20 (citation omitted).
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provides that any member of the taskforce can call for a “Biology and
Monitoring Review” process that would include “identify[ing] the
reasons why particular demographic or habitat objectives have not been
achieved and . . . modify[ing] management as necessary.” 212 Despite this
detailed adaptive management plan, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the
delisting decision, explaining that “[f]or adaptive management of a
potential threat to suffice as a basis for a delisting determination, we
believe that more specific management responses, tied to more specific
triggering criteria, are required.” 213 In the nomenclature that this Article
proposes, the court essentially rejected the concept of adaptive
regulation, instead requiring that agencies implement contingent
regulation. 214
Adaptive management is also included in less headline-grabbing
decisions. For example, BLM incorporated adaptive management into
its travel management plan for the Clear Creek Management Area.
Clear Creek includes a geologic formation which is high in asbestos and
through which numerous off-road vehicle trails cross. 215 BLM’s goals in
managing vehicle access in the area are to minimize the risks to public
health that may be caused by traversing this formation and to allow
ample opportunities for recreation. 216 The plan provides the public with
access to certain routes and establishes that “[i]f any of the following
‘adaptive management criteria’ are met, BLM would reinitiate travel
management planning.” 217 Those criteria include the emergence of
research establishing “effective strategies” to reduce exposure to asbestos
or indicating a “significant reduction in the toxicity values for
asbestos.” 218
Adaptive regulation has seen little actual use outside the
environmental and natural resources context, although scholars
increasingly call for its adoption. Roberta Romano, for example, has
argued that financial markets present regulators with a dynamic
environment full of unknowns and that adaptive regulation should be
deployed to allow laws to respond to market feedback. 219 The
importance of implementing such an approach arises from the
externalities imposed by regulations that are poorly calibrated to
Id. at 10.
Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011).
214 See id.
215 See BLM, CLEAR CREEK MANAGEMENT AREA, supra note 204, at 1-1.
216 Id. at 21.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 22.
219 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 68, at 103; see also, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, The
Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1295
(2012).
212
213
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address financial markets—regulations which are often created in a
moment of crisis against a backdrop of incomplete information. 220
Rosie Cooney and Andrew Lang have similarly proposed
incorporating adaptive regulation into international governance
regimes. 221 International trade agreements, for example, often involve
complex interdependencies between states that are incompletely
understood, and such agreements therefore have unpredictable and
sometimes negative outcomes. 222 By focusing on continuous learning,
governance structures could better reflect the dynamic nature of
international social systems. 223 Cooney and Lang specifically argue that
the World Trade Organization (WTO) should incorporate adaptive
regulation because that entity faces significant uncertainty about the
effects of its decisions on natural, social, and economic systems.224
Adaptive regulation could enable the WTO to avoid acting prematurely,
and could instead enable it to proceed experimentally in order to
improve the effectiveness of its interventions. 225
3.

Benefits and Burdens of Adaptive Regulation

Adaptive regulation has proven to be an intoxicating approach to
lawmaking and scholars and has become a mainstay of environmental
and natural resources policymaking, although even its strongest
advocates recognize that it may not be suited for all regulatory
contexts. 226 It has three significant benefits.
First, adaptive regulation allows lawmakers to adjust their
decisions based on new information and new conditions without
predetermining the most appropriate regulatory response. By declining
to commit to policy responses in advance, adaptive regulation avoids the
inertia created by front-end decisions. 227 Once government has
announced a particular course for regulation, changing that course can
be difficult because regulated entities organize their affairs around the
announced course. Because adaptive regulation is intentionally and
transparently open-ended, it reduces the expectation of regulatory
See Romano, supra note 68, at 88.
Cooney & Lang, supra note 13, at 524.
222 Id. at 532–33.
223 Id. at 534.
224 Id. at 536, 547–48.
225 Id.
226 See, e.g., Craig & Ruhl, supra note 11, at 12–13.
227 While the use durational regulation reflects the appeal of ongoing change in a similar
fashion to the appeal of adaptive regulation, it does so less self-consciously and creates a risk
that the initial legal regime may become institutionalized and therefore difficult to change.
220
221
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certainty. This is particularly true for active adaptive management,
whereby agencies deploy multiple regulatory interventions
simultaneously. 228 In such circumstances, no one rule will become
entrenched because several are implemented simultaneously.
The flexibility of adaptive regulation, at least in theory, is difficult
to overstate. Adaptive regulation tries to replace guesswork at the front
end of a regulatory regime with knowledge as the regime unfolds. No
matter the sophistication or expertise of lawmakers, unforeseen events
will occur, and adaptive regulation is designed with that in mind.
Adaptive regulation recognizes the impossibility of achieving socially
optimal rules, and it emphasizes the search for improvement as a
replacement for efforts to achieve perfection.
Second, adaptive regulation spreads the cost of decision-making
over time by reducing up-front costs, particularly when compared to
contingent regulation and its requirement that lawmakers identify and
plan for all foreseeable contingencies before making an initial
decision. 229 Where uncertainty is at its apex, this may be a particularly
effective strategy. Lawmakers may have little ability to predict which
circumstances may emerge in the future, and the effort to do so may
prove costly and ineffective. Adaptive regulation requires no such
planning because it allows rules to change as new information arises.
Third, adaptive regulation may be better suited to producing
information than other approaches to uncertainty. Difficult governance
problems require investigation and experimentation. Many social
problems appear intractable, and an evolutionary approach to
governance offers the promise of transformation and consensus. This
approach is of particular appeal where the risk of catastrophic or
irreversible consequences is low. For example, the Forest Service
manages seventy-nine experimental forests on federal land with the
clear purpose and design of improving the government’s understanding
of the effectiveness of forestry practices. 230 The long-term effects of
experimenting within those forests are low, particularly because they
account for only a quarter of one percent of all national forest lands. 231
See supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text.
The monitoring required for effective adaptive regulation may carry substantial costs. See
Biber, supra note 11, at 945–48. Effective monitoring is, however, required for all forms of
dynamic law.
230 See, e.g., FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPERIMENTAL FORESTS AND RANGES OF
THE USDA FOREST SERVICE (Mary Beth Adams et al. eds., 2008), http://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/
gtr/gtr_ne321R.pdf?. Experimental forests and ranges are used for scientific research of all
types, not only research into forest management. See id.
231 Compare Ariel E. Lugo et al., Long-Term Research at the USDA Forest Service’s
Experimental Forests and Ranges, 56 BIOSCIENCE 39, 41 (2006) (stating that USDA experimental
forests and ranges encompass 196,300 hectares), with FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
NATURAL RESOURCE BASED TOURISM 1, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacj363.pdf (stating
228
229
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Adaptive management has become widely embraced because it is
difficult to dispute its premises. 232 The modern eye recognizes
complexity and uncertainty everywhere. We fear to commit to any
particular policy for fear of being wrong. Adaptive management has a
palliative effect by allowing us to postpone hard decisions until a future
time. Why choose today when we will know more tomorrow?
While the effectiveness of current instantiations of adaptive
regulation have come under fire in recent years, few environmental law
scholars dispute that uncertainty about the environment requires openended evolutionary processes of adaptive regulation. Adaptive
regulation might be too costly, 233 difficult to reconcile with existing
administrative law 234 or statutes, 235 unlikely to survive judicial review, 236
or too easily manipulated for political gain. 237 But most scholars agree
that it is “far more suited to the needs of future regulatory challenges
than is prescriptive regulation.” 238 These concerns, however, are
substantial and worthy of consideration. In many circumstances, other
forms of dynamic law may address uncertainty while avoiding these
problems.
A central problem of adaptive regulation is that it only provides for
process, and due to resource constraints, a lack of political will, or
continuing uncertainty, the promise of adaptation is too often
unfulfilled. Adaptive regulation “can make it easier for agencies to yield
to the temptation to dodge difficult, controversial decisions,” and to
that USDA manages 77 million hectares). Policy experimentation faces significantly higher
risks in other contexts. For example, the federal government manages the Columbia River for
the purposes of conserving thirteen threatened and endangered fish stocks and producing a
considerable portion of the Northwest’s electricity. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN.,
REINVESTING IN ASSETS 4 (2013), http://www.bpa.gov/news/pubs/FactSheets/fs-201307Reinvesting%20in%20assets.pdf.; Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in
ESA Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 99 (2013).
232 For example, J.B. Ruhl recently outlined principles for the development of laws that can
exhibit resilience and adaptive capacity in the face of climate change. Ruhl, Resilience and
Adaptive Capacity, supra note 188, at 1382. His model emphasizes the development of law that
contains internal mechanisms to develop in new directions based on emerging information,
relying heavily on theories of adaptive management. See id. at 1391. It is certainly true that
climate change has the potential to place unforeseeable strain on society and the legal structure.
Emphasizing open-ended evolution, however, overlooks the many consequences of climate
change that are foreseeable and that can enable government to put substantive responses in
place to those consequences, rather than to simply wait until they manifest.
233 See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11.
234 See Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 128.
235 See Julie Thrower, Note, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View
of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOLGY L.Q. 871, 879 (2006).
236 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 447.
237 See Doremus, “New Age” Environmental Protection, supra note 21, at 55–56.
238 Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 29.
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address challenging problems by offering vague promises for future
action. 239 Ensuring public accountability can also prove challenging
because adaptive regulation processes are often opaque to outside
observers. 240
The challenges that come with adaptive regulation may be
responsible for its mixed track record in practice. The promise of
flexible regulation has often devolved into endless iterative decisionmaking processes that have lost sight of the relevant fundamental goals.
One example is the decades-long adaptive management of the Columbia
River, which sought to balance the needs of endangered salmon with
agricultural and electric utility interests. 241 Regulators have relied on
adaptive management to consistently side-step difficult political issues,
and this indefinite regulatory limbo has resulted in the Oregon District
Court vacating numerous plans for operating the system. 242
Adaptive regulation also may not provide the information that is
needed to recalibrate a regulatory regime. Holly Doremus has argued
that adaptive regulation only makes sense when experimentation with
management options can reasonably be expected to fill the information
gaps that regulators face. 243 Where experimentation is unlikely to
produce useful information—because, for example, the number of
variables are too high or the timescale to assess the success of any option
is too great—adaptive regulation will not produce improved
governance, but rather will constitute an empty formality. 244
Adaptive regulation also faces legal problems because its
fundamental premise—open-ended discretion and flexibility—conflicts
with the broader framework of administrative law. The procedural
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species Act, among
others, make it difficult for agencies to quickly modify their decisions to
Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 459–60.
See Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1463
(“Uncertainty therefore makes it difficult for the public to discern whether managers are doing
their best to follow legislative direction or instead bowing to political pressure.”).
241 See, e.g., Schultz & Nie, supra note 22, at 470–73; John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn
from a River? Managing Uncertainty in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 740–
62 (1999).
242 See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or.
2011); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Or. 2003);
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886 (D. Or. 1994),
vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995).
243 Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1467.
Doremus specifies three necessary conditions for adaptive management: “First, there must be
an information gap that is important to management choices. Second, it must seem possible to
fill that gap on a management-relevant time scale. Third, it must seem possible to adjust the
initial decision over time in response to new information.” Id.
244 Id. at 1467–68.
239
240
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incorporate new information. 245 Moreover, courts have generally found
that a general commitment to adaptively manage is an insufficiently
precise explanation for an agency’s approach to meeting its statutory
obligations. 246 These constraints are not inherent problems of adaptive
regulation, but rather make effective adaptive regulation difficult to
achieve.
Relatedly, adaptive management may offer agencies a means of
increasing their discretion at the expense of democratic constraints. In
its 2004 planning regulations, the U.S. Forest Service proposed a
“paradigm shift in land management planning” and embraced a more
adaptive approach to managing forestlands 247 —an emphasis that
persisted in the 2008 and 2015 planning rules. 248 Critics have argued
that, in reality, this move toward adaptation constitutes “a means to
remove standards, undermine [the National Environmental Policy Act]
and [the National Forest Management Act], and maximize agency
discretion.” 249
Managing public resources to enhance learning also poses
normative problems. Federal land managers have an obligation to
manage public resources for the benefit of the public. Producing
knowledge is important and worthwhile, but such production should
not become an end goal. Just as a financial manager should make
investments geared toward enhancing a client’s wealth, so too should
governmental entities act to preserve and enhance the quality of public
resources for the benefit of the public. The importance of achieving
resource protection is sometimes overlooked by advocates of adaptive
regulation, who occasionally act more like scientists than policy experts.
For example, Kai Lee lamented Australia’s decision to ban timber
harvesting in the rainforests of Queensland. Prior to the ban, timber
managers experimented with models for sustainable yields. “Without an
experimental program of management at the ecosystem scale, . . . we can
be certain that some important questions will remain unanswered.” 250
Lee is certainly correct that banning logging caused government
managers to lose the opportunity to learn more about the effects of
See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 426; see also Craig & Ruhl, supra note 11.
See, e.g., Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011).
247 National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023-01, 1024 (Jan. 5,
2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
248 See National Forest System, Land Management Planning Directives, 80 Fed. Reg. 668301, 6684 (Feb. 6, 2015); National Forest System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg.
21,468-01, 21,468 (Apr. 21, 2008) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
249 Martin Nie, Whatever Happened to Ecosystem Management and Federal Lands Planning?,
in THE LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
LAW & POLICY 67, 68, 77 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2013).
250 LEE, supra note 46, at 112.
245
246
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timber harvesting. If logging can no longer occur, however, that
knowledge is of questionable value from the perspective of managing
public resources. Adaptive regulation, then, may threaten to substitute
the goals of scientific inquiry for the goals of governance.
Finally, adaptive management may prove rudderless in at least
some of its manifestations. Adaptive regulation could be used both to
tailor regulation to new information and to determine the very goals of
management. In other words, “knowledge gained by experiment would
improve either the goals pursued or the means by which they are
achieved.”251 If the goals of governance are up for grabs in an adaptive
management process, this renders the project of governance inherently
unstable. 252 Where a policy’s meta-goal includes the modification of its
first order priorities, it risks proceeding without a compass.
C.

Contingent Regulation

Unlike durational regulation and adaptive regulation, contingent
regulation incorporates mechanisms that automatically adjust the
substantive content of legal rules when foreseeable events occur or new
information emerges. To an extent, contingent regulation resembles
static law in that it involves no ongoing process for reconsidering legal
rules. Yet, contingent regulation remains responsive.
1.

The Structure of Contingent Regulation

Contingent regulation resembles the type of contingency planning
consistently practiced by individuals, families, and businesses. It is a
branching legal framework that creates an initial legal rule, identifies
foreseeable events that might undermine the efficacy of that rule, and
creates a plan as to how that legal rule should change in response. In a
sense, contingent regulation is static because choices are all made at the
outset when a law is first created. Yet it is also dynamic because the
operative legal rule changes alongside changing circumstances. To the
challenge of uncertainty, contingent regulation answers: if relevant
information emerges in the future, the legal rule will automatically
change in a predetermined fashion.
Like durational and adaptive regulation, contingent regulation
enables law to keep pace with real-world circumstances. If adaptive
Id. at 129.
Cf. Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 11, at 1469
(identifying “the need for clear goals set exogenously to the adaptive management process”).
251
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regulation is the regulatory analog of evolution, contingent regulation is
analogous to the somewhat more obscure biological concept of
“plasticity.” Plasticity refers to the ability of organisms to respond to
changes in the environment based on existing genetic traits. 253 For
example, some caterpillars exhibit different coloration and shape
depending on their food source. If the caterpillar eats oak flowers, for
example, it grows to camouflage itself as an oak catkin. If it eats leaves, it
grows to camouflage itself as a twig. 254 The caterpillar has the genetic
potential to assume either shape, and the environment it happens to
encounter determines its form. Contingent regulation proceeds
similarly. Lawmakers put in place a regulatory structure that functions
as the DNA of the law. That DNA encodes built-in responses to
identified contingencies.
Contingent regulation is, then, an ex ante approach to uncertainty.
In formulating contingent regulation, lawmakers must identify and map
possible circumstances that will arise after a legal rule is promulgated.
For each foreseeable condition, a decision must be made as to if and
how the legal rule should change in response. Naturally, it is
unavoidable that a framework built on contingent regulation will
envision many eventualities that will never come to pass.
2.

Contingent Regulation Across Contexts

While contingent regulation has not previously been named, it has
been deployed in both legislation and regulation. At times this has
occurred under the moniker of adaptive management, despite the
differences inherent in the two approaches.
The Fish and Wildlife Service’s handbook governing Habitat
Conservation Plans (HCPs) is one of the few sources that treat
contingent regulation as distinct from adaptive management. 255 The
Endangered Species Act requires an HCP for any party seeking an
incidental take permit to authorize an activity that may incidentally
harm a threatened or endangered species. 256 Such harm is otherwise
253 See Cynthia Weinig et al., Testing Adaptive Plasticity to UV: Costs and Benefits of Stem
Elongation and Light-Induced Phenolics, 58 EVOLUTION 2645, 2645 (2004); John L. Maron et al.,
Rapid Evolution of an Invasive Plant, 74 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 261, 261–62 (2004).
254 See Douglas W. Whitman & Anurag A. Agrawal, What is Phenotypic Plasticity and why is
it Important?, in PHENOTYPIC PLASTICITY OF INSECTS: MECHANISMS AND CONSEQUENCES 2
(Douglas W. Whitman & T.N. Ananthakrishnan eds., 2009).
255 See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADDENDUM TO THE HCP
HANDBOOK 5 (2000) [hereinafter USFWS, HCP ADDENDUM], http://www.fws.gov/midwest/
endangered/permits/hcp/pdf/HCPAddendum.pdf.
256 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (2012).
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prohibited. 257 An HCP must, “to the maximum extent practicable,
minimize and mitigate the impacts” of the activity on the protected
species. 258 The handbook governing the development of HCPs requires
“contingency planning” to “incorporate measures to be implemented”
in the event that “circumstances that can be reasonably anticipated”
occur. 259 The handbook treats contingency planning as distinct from
adaptive regulation, explaining that it “lays a foundation for
contingency planning in HCPs that may or may not include adaptive
management.” 260 Elsewhere, however, the Fish and Wildlife Service has
treated contingency planning as a variety of adaptive management. 261
The City of Seattle’s HCP, which covers the Cedar River watershed,
is a good example of contingent regulation. 262 The City uses the
watershed as its water supply and its activities in the watershed impact
fourteen protected species, including six birds, six fish, and two
mammals. 263 The plan establishes extensive conservation efforts for
these species and includes
a commitment to an adaptive approach with two variations: (1)
contingent responses for changed circumstances related to
environmental events, and a formal approach with predefined
criteria and decision thresholds for specific activities where
considerable uncertainty exists; and (2) a second, less formal and
more flexible approach that will be used as a simple tool or
mechanism for responding to new information and experience that
can be used to make conservation, management, and mitigation
strategies more effective. 264

The first approach constitutes contingent regulation: it provides
specific triggers and specific responses to emerging conditions. The
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2012).
§ 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii).
259 USFWS, HCP ADDENDUM, supra note 255, at 5–6; see also J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by
Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 49 (explaining that the “No Surprises rule” includes
requirements to “specify the kinds of events and responses for which adjustments will be
made”).
260 USFWS, HCP ADDENDUM, supra note255, at 5.
261 See Marj Nelson, The Changing Face of HCPs, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/what-we-do/bulletins/bulletin-summer2000.html (last visited
Sept. 16, 2015).
262 See generally SEATTLE PUB. UTILS., CITY OF SEATTLE, FINAL CEDAR RIVER WATERSHED
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN (2000) [hereinafter SEATTLE HCP], http://www.seattle.gov/util/
EnvironmentConservation/OurWatersheds/Habitat_Conservation_Plan/AbouttheHCP/
Documents/index.htm.
263 Id. at 3.4-3. Not all of these species are threatened or endangered. HCPs may, however,
include plans for species that may be afforded protection under the ESA at a later time. See U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT 1 (2011), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/hcp.pdf.
264 SEATTLE HCP, supra note 262, at 4.5-3.
257
258
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second approach constitutes open-ended and largely unspecified
adaptive regulation.
The contingent regulation aspects of the plan further identify
management responses in the event of “forest fires,” “windstorms,”
“disease outbreaks and insect infestations,” “landslides,” and
“drought.” 265 These prescriptions are detailed and specific. If a forest fire
“remove[s] forest cover on at least 300 acres but less than 2,000 acres in
any major subbasin,” then the City will take management action,
including “[m]easures to reduce erosion and sedimentation, including
stabilization of slopes and soils by such steps as reseeding, reforestation,
and log terracing.” 266
BLM’s 2008 plan for managing natural gas activities in the Pinedale
Anticline also incorporates contingent regulation. 267 The plan includes a
“Wildlife Monitoring and Mitigation Matrix,” 268 which identifies species
of concern and various criteria that BLM will monitor. If, for example, a
“30% change in total number of active” locations for greater sage grouse
mating rituals occur, then mitigation is required, 269 including
“[p]rotection of flank areas from disturbance (e.g., voluntary lease
suspensions, lease buyouts, voluntary limits on area of
delineation/development drilling) to assure continued habitat function
of flank areas, and to provide areas for enhancement of habitat
function.” 270
Reliance on contingency, rather than adaptation, has caused
consternation for some scholars. For example, J.B. Ruhl and Robert
Fischman discuss contingency planning as a form of adaptive
management, referring to the contingency provisions of HCPs as “‘a/mlite,’ a watered-down version of [adaptive management] theory that
resembles ad hoc contingency planning more than it does planned
‘learning while doing.’” 271 Contingent regulation is not, however, a
variety of adaptive management, but rather its own approach to
governance.
Id. at 4.5-67–76.
Id. at 4.5-69.
267 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
268 BLM ROD, supra note 53, at app. B-1.
269 BLM 2008 SEIS APPENDIX, supra note 18, at 10-3.
270 Id. at 10-5. “Flank areas” are on the periphery of the Pinedale Anticline and not the
primary focus of gas development under BLM’s current plan. See BLM ROD, supra note 53, at
8.
271 Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 426 (footnote omitted); see also Ruhl, Regulation by
Adaptive Management, supra note 128, at 49 (discussing contingencies in HCPs). In his
detailed review of the HCP program, Alejandro Camacho descriptively distinguishes between
contingency planning and adaptive management while arguing that “the Services have failed to
adaptively manage the regulatory process.” See Camacho, supra note 19, at 357. Camacho does
not analyze the differences between these forms of dynamic regulation.
265
266
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Benefits and Burdens of Contingent Regulation

Contingent regulation offers advantages unrealized by other forms
of dynamic law. This Section describes those advantages in more detail
than that provided for adaptive regulation and durational regulation
because contingent regulation has received so little attention.
Understanding contingent regulation as a unique policy approach,
rather than as a failure of adaptive regulation, reveals its worth. True
adaptive regulation, with its open-ended and difficult-to-cabin
commitment to “learning while doing” may be a necessary but costly
approach to certain problems where uncertainty permeates the
regulatory context. Contingent regulation, however, provides an
essential tool to allow government to implement future-oriented actions
without taking on the panoply of burdens imposed by adaptive
regulation.
All forms of dynamic law enable legal rules to respond to new
information and all generate information that may, in turn, improve
those legal rules. Contingent regulation requires additional study of
regulatory problems at the outset, thereby increasing the information
available to regulators before they make a decision. Such information is
generated for two reasons. In creating contingent regulation, lawmakers
must fully specify and study the regulatory task at hand, and they must
identify with precision the uncertainties faced as well as the extent to
which future circumstances can be predicted. 272
Contingent regulation also creates incentives for regulated parties
to share information, thereby increasing the information available to
lawmakers. 273 The information-forcing role of contingencies is well
understood in the private party context. Parties in a contract negotiation
have incentives to downplay their assessment of the likelihood of future
events that will devalue the consideration they offer, but contingencies
272 Generating information about the future may also have the salutary effect of improving
the initial regulatory regime. For example, Lynn Blais and Wendy Wanger have argued that
when making rules, agencies “would evaluate . . . the degree to which technological innovation
is likely to advance in the relevant field in the future” and would incorporate such information
into established standards. Blais & Wagner, supra note 174, at 1731 (2008). Engaging in the
process of developing contingent regulation will compel such consideration. Id. at 1732.
273 As Lynn E. Blais and Wendy E. Wagner have explained, regulatory efforts designed to
address problems that have not galvanized the public face significant obstacles because
“interested parties—most likely regulated groups—will have a great deal of information at their
fingertips and both the incentives and the resources to use the courts and any other
mechanisms at their disposal . . . to delay . . . rulemaking or rule revision.” Blais & Wagner,
supra note 174, at 1712. Contingent regulation does not fully correct this problem because
regulated industries may be able to stave off regulatory efforts before they have begun. Where a
lawmaker begins construction of a legal regime to address a problem, however, contingent
regulation can facilitate information disclosure, which in turn can facilitate public engagement.
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can force disclosure. Imagine the following contract negotiation
between an oil company and an industrial customer for a requirements
contract for a supply of oil. The oil company suggests that the price of
oil will increase during the coming year and, therefore, asks for a price
above current market. The industrial customer has less information
about the future price of oil and bargains at a disadvantage. The
customer can, however, resolve this informational asymmetry by
offering to accept a price that exceeds the current market, but on the
condition that if oil prices fall, the contract price will be substantially
reduced. The contingency will force the oil company to disclose the
information it holds. If the oil company has reasonable confidence that
oil prices will rise, it will accept the bargain. If, on the other hand, the oil
company has little confidence in its prediction, or possesses information
that prices will fall, then it will not.
Contingent regulation acts similarly. Regulated parties generally
have an incentive to conceal information about the potential harm
caused by their activities. Creating contingencies can erode this
incentive because the advocacy efforts of regulated parties will reveal
their knowledge: they will resist rules attached to contingencies that they
expect to occur and will remain indifferent to those attached to
contingencies that they expect will not occur. In a hypothetical example,
a zoning board considers a measure to restrict development within an
area likely to be subject to flooding in the event of a one-foot rise in sea
level. One board member opposes restricting development because, she
explains, it will unnecessarily inhibit economic growth because sea
levels are not rising. A second board member favors restricting
development because of an expected rise in sea level. Contingent
regulation tests the convictions of both parties by creating a regime that
includes relaxed restrictions if sea levels remains constant, but creates
rigid restrictions if sea levels rise. If both board members have
confidence in their negotiating positions, they should accept this
compromise. If one or the other does not sincerely adhere to her
negotiating position, then she will resist the compromise, thereby
disclosing information about her true assessment of the situation, which
in turn will facilitate a more finely tuned negotiation.
Similarly, business interests that seek to avoid perceived
burdensome regulations of carbon emissions may express objections in
the form of denying the existence of climate change. The process of
developing contingent regulation can unmask such pretextual
disagreement. This will be true generally. Regulated parties often oppose
regulation by contesting causation rather than by challenging the goals
of environmental protection. As Kai Lee explains, “conflict over means
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becomes a way of disputing goals.” 274 Contingent regulation can peel
back such dishonest opposition.
A related advantage is that where disagreements involve differing
beliefs, contingent regulation facilitates compromise. That is because
contingent regulation can accommodate competing predictions about
the future by creating regulatory rules to govern each possibility.
Contingent regulation also more easily accommodates existing
norms of administrative law than adaptive regulation does. Ruhl and
Fischman have explored the tension between administrative law and
adaptive regulation, finding that the United States government has lost
more than half of the cases in which plaintiffs challenged decisions to
implement adaptive regulation. 275 Administrative law requires federal
agencies to fully explain their decisions at the outset, 276 favoring a frontloaded decision process that culminates in a single record of decision
that allows for judicial review. Environmental review obligations
imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) further
complicate adaptive regulation because “a promise to adaptively manage
problems may not fulfill the NEPA requirement that agencies take a
‘hard look’ at the impacts of their action.” 277 Adaptive regulation fits
with these requirements poorly because it relies on evolutionary
decisions that do not manifest at a single moment. Contingent
regulation, on the other hand, fits comfortably within the existing
framework. Contingent regulation requires lawmakers to address
foreseeable circumstances and to identify specific government
responses. Agencies will have to adequately justify these substantive
decisions, and fully analyze their environmental consequences. That
process lends itself to existing modes of judicial review. This is not a
theoretical advantage of contingent regulation, but rather a practical
advantage that suggests that contingent regulation may be more
successful than adaptive regulation in light of the existing architecture
of administrative law.
Contingent regulation also minimizes delays in responding to new
information. Government decision-making takes time and consumes
resources. Where changing conditions require new legal rules, all other
forms of governance require lawmakers to intervene. Because
lawmaking processes inherently favor the status quo, parties that benefit
LEE, supra note 46, at 107.
See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 445.
276 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971),
abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
277 Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 460; see also High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Weingardt,
521 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (vacating an agency decision to liberalize a campfire
policy that included an adaptive management plan to address potential problems).
274
275
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from the existing regime will have incentives to delay or derail reform.
Contingent regulation allows for a prompt and nimble response to
changing circumstances because the new legal rule has already been
selected. Modification becomes a ministerial act, rather than requiring
renewed deliberation.
Finally, contingent regulation may enable lawmakers to avoid
public choice pitfalls. Public choice theory posits that a relatively small
number of parties affected strongly by government action will have
greater influence on government decision-making than a larger group of
parties that experience smaller affects. 278 While scholars may
overestimate the effects of such interest-group politics, 279 it has been
well documented in at least some instances. 280
Processes to adopt static law also may be particularly susceptible to
public choice problems because those parties subject to government
restrictions seeking to provide diffuse public goods have significant
incentive to lobby for loose standards. When the government adopts
regulations to govern conduct, private interests will often be easy to
ascertain. And because static law imposes certain and precise
limitations, these rules will be highly salient to affected parties. Duration
and adaptive regulation may reduce public choice at the time of the
initial decision because possible future changes in legal rules will be
unclear. However, later reevaluations will likely crystallize the effect that
new management regimes will have. Because contingent regulation
establishes regulatory rules that will come into effect in the future, but
only if certain events transpire, these decisions should be less salient to
private interests, thereby reducing incentives for lobbying. Indeed, it
may be unpredictable when initial rules are established which parties
will be most affected by future restrictions because the timing of those
restrictions is unclear. Moreover, if different contingencies benefit
different parties, then everyone may support a contingent regulation
approach when first promulgated in hopes that the contingency that
benefits them will go into effect.
Contingent regulation is not a panacea. Unlike durational and
adaptive regulations, contingent regulation frontloads governmental
278 Public choice theory posits “that a small number of people or corporations with similar
interests and a relatively large stake in regulatory outcomes will enjoy comparative success
organizing into effective lobbying groups.” Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory
Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1643 (2011).
279 Public choice theory does not exhaustively explain decisions of administrative agencies.
Dave Owen has argued, for example, that in addition to responding to political constituencies,
“meaningful regulatory effort comes from within the agencies.” See Dave Owen, Critical
Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141, 188 (2012).
280 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 1029, 1034–37 (2011) (book review).
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costs. It forces lawmakers to consider foreseeable future circumstances
and decide how law should respond, even if those circumstances may
not manifest. Forecasting potential future circumstance may be
expensive both in terms of money and time, particularly if foreseen
circumstances will require nuanced responses.
The efficacy of contingent regulation will also be cabined by the
ability of lawmakers to predict and plan. Moreover, contingent
regulation cannot take account of unforeseen future events. Because it
may require substantial government investment to develop a regulatory
superstructure capable of responding to foreseen circumstances, that
regime may prove particularly sticky should unforeseen circumstances
occur. Such stickiness may result from the “sunk cost” fallacy, a
cognitive error that causes people to increasingly resist changing course
as historic costs increase. 281 In other words, if contingent regulation fails
to identify future circumstances, amendment or repeal may be
particularly difficult to accomplish.
Contingent regulation is also less flexible than either durational
regulation or adaptive regulation. As Bradley Karkkainen has argued in
his critique of contingency planning, “it does not have the open texture,
flexibility, unboundedness, and openness to surprise and unanticipated
changes contemplated by advocates of adaptive management.” 282
Contingent regulation creates a specific set of regulatory responses to a
specific set of conditions. It cannot respond to conditions other than
those envisioned at the outset, and it will not optimally respond if new
information reveals problems with pre-selected regulatory responses.
These are substantial shortcomings, although each model of
governance has its weakness. The next Part will suggest criteria for
selecting models of governance to address specific problems.
IV. GOVERNANCE TOOL SELECTION
As Parts II and III have explained, lawmakers have multiple
strategies at their disposal to address uncertainty when enacting law.
Consider again the state highway department concerned about fatalities
on a particular stretch of highway, and suppose that the highway has an
existing speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour. Imagine the department
has set a goal of reducing accidents by twenty-five percent. The
281 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1482–83 (1998); see also Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66
FLA. L. REV. 779, 784–85 (2014) (arguing that sunk costs may distort judges’ decisions on the
merits following the issuance of a preliminary injunction).
282 Karkkainen, supra note 22, at 72.
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department could take four approaches. First, the department could rely
on static law. It would look at available information, which, say,
indicates that a fifty-five miles per hour speed limit will achieve the
desired results, and then impose that speed limit. Second, the
department could rely on durational regulation by imposing a fifty-five
miles per hour speed limit set to automatically expire after two years.
Third, the department could use adaptive regulation. It could set the
speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour and put in place a process by
which the driving conditions on the road will be revisited if new
information emerges. If and when such information emerges, the
department would consider that information and make any necessary
adjustments. Perhaps monitoring the road indicates that a particularly
sharp curve contributes to accidents, and in response to that
information, the road could be realigned to eliminate the danger.
Fourth, the department could rely on contingent regulation. The
department could set the speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour and
specify that if, after two years, safety has improved by less than the
twenty-five percent goal, the speed limit will automatically reduce by
five miles per hour. If, on the other hand, safety improves by more than
twenty-five percent, the speed limit could automatically rise by five
miles per hour.
How should a lawmaker select an approach in a specific
circumstance? When is stability more important than dynamism? And if
dynamism better addresses a particular problem or a particular set of
circumstances, what form should that dynamism take?
This Part turns to those questions. As it reveals, optimal tool
selection takes account of a number of factors, including the costs
associated with dynamic law, the variety of uncertainty involved, and
the resources a lawmaker possesses to revisit past decisions. As Figure 2
suggests, particular models of governance will often be suited to a
particular constellation of those variables. Where dynamism imposes a
high cost relative to the benefits likely to flow from more responsive
governance, static law should be chosen. Where the benefits exceed
costs, a dynamic solution is more appropriate. In such circumstances,
contingent regulation is most appropriate where the lawmaker has
reasonable confidence that it can predict likely future circumstances. If
not, durational regulation is appropriate where the lawmaker is resource
rich. If the lawmaker faces the likelihood of unforeseen future
circumstances and is resource poor, it should select adaptive regulation.
These variables—the benefits and costs of dynamism, the type of
uncertainty involved, and the resource richness of the lawmaker—
provide a diagnostic framework to aid lawmakers in deciding what form
of governance is best suited to a particular problem. Each variable is
discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this Part.
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Costs and Benefits of Dynamism

The first variable lawmakers need to consider when selecting a tool
to govern in the face of uncertainty is the expected costs and benefits
associated with making a legal regime respond dynamically to new
information. Where the cost of dynamism outweighs likely benefits,
static law is the most appropriate tool. Where dynamism will result in
net social benefit, a form of dynamic law is appropriate.
Understanding the benefits side of this equation involves assessing
the goals of lawmaking and the severity of errors. Dynamic law provides
few benefits for certain lawmaking goals, particularly where a legal rule
is designed to instantiate a particular moral viewpoint, such as the
Convention Against Torture’s prohibition on torture, 283 or a
punishment practice pursuing retributive ends. Such legal rules are
communicative acts and do not primarily aim at attaining particular
results. Dynamic law has little to offer. When, however, a legal regime
283

See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
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aims at real-world effects, such as protecting public health, deterring
illegal entry into the country, or ensuring the survival of an endangered
species, creating a legal regime that can account for new information
yields benefits.
Such benefits may, however, be slight. Sometimes getting a legal
regime exactly right matters a great deal, other times it matters less.
When states adopted the right side driving rule, uncertainty existed as to
the consequences of that decision, but the likely severity of those
consequences was low. The right side driving rule may slightly increase
accident rates, but that risk is likely outweighed by the value of a stable
legal regime. 284 Other times, tailoring a legal rule to new information is
likely to generate significantly greater benefits. If information reveals
that SEC regulation of derivatives markets is allowing high volatility due
to uncertainty about the risk adhering to certain financial instruments,
and that this dynamic could lead to another recession, adjustments of
that regime will create important dividends.
The costs of dynamism arise from two sources: the cost to
government actors in developing and implementing law, and the costs
to the regulated community of responding to law. Creating dynamic
regulation is an inherently complex task that requires lawmakers to
consider more than the immediate government action at hand. Putting
in place mechanisms to address changing circumstances may require
substantial investment at the front end as lawmakers design policy.
Dynamic law may require more attention, involve more expertise, and
take longer to develop. This burdens lawmakers and also delays
regulatory intervention, as well as the social benefits that such
intervention produces. This means the costs of developing dynamic law
will virtually always exceed static law—however, the severity of that
discrepancy may differ dramatically from context to context. Up-front
costs also vary among varieties of dynamic law. Contingent regulation
will often consume the most resources because it requires lawmakers to
map foreseeable future circumstances and develop individual responses
for each of the circumstances envisioned. Adaptive regulation and
durational regulation do not require comprehensive prediction of future
circumstances; rather, they require lawmakers to develop procedures
and incentives to facilitate later reconsideration. As such, they will
typically require fewer up-front resources than contingent regulation
would, but greater up-front resources than static law.
Dynamic law also imposes ongoing costs on government. 285 These
resources will be consumed by efforts to monitor the efficacy of the
284
285

See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
By delayed costs, I mean costs that arise after the initial decision-making process.
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initial legal rule. Modification under all three models of dynamic law
will also consume resources. From this perspective, contingent
regulation fairs better than adaptive regulation and durational
regulation. Contingent regulation does not require government actors
to develop new regulatory responses to emerging information. Rather,
the legal regime itself has a blueprint identifying how legal rules will
change. Nonetheless, contingent regulation requires government
resources to formally trigger a contingency and notify regulated entities
of new legal rules. Durational regulation and adaptive regulation will
consume greater costs over time because they require lawmakers to
reconsider the legal regime in light of new information. The process of
reconsidering legal rules will also provide an opportunity for interested
parties to engage in rent-seeking behavior to pursue modification of
legal rules that are beneficial to them. 286
The ongoing costs of durational and adaptive regulation may be
particularly high when these strategies are deployed by administrative
agencies. NEPA and its state counterparts require analysis of foreseeable
environmental consequences of agency decisions. 287 Where agencies
create internal mechanisms by which decisions will adjust, they must
assess the consequences of each contingency incorporated into the legal
framework alongside the consequences of the initial decision. Courts
may also view adaptive regulation with skepticism, increasing the cost of
that strategy. 288
Dynamic law, particularly adaptive and durational regulations,
may also impose significant political costs. Virtually every modification
of existing rules will result in a response from some political
constituency. That response may constrain the willingness of
government actors to engage in other sensitive decision-making
processes, and it may result in a decision not to modify the legal rule

286 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 191, 196 (2012) (explaining the effects of using lobbying “to skew public policy in
particular directions”). Congress’s inability to modify statutes, even when there is broad
support for reform, exemplifies this pattern. The prospect of congressional action galvanizes
interest groups to demand additional modifications in order to benefit their own interests. The
Endangered Species Act may have benefitted from this phenomenon. During the 1990s, there
was reasonably broad support for some modification of the Act to ameliorate some of its more
economically costly effects. But Congress could not agree on a particular and limited set of
adjustments, and as a result, the Act remained unchanged. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE
MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125–50 (2004).
287 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2015) (defining the word “effects” to include effects that
are “reasonably foreseeable” for the purposes of NEPA); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064(d)
(requiring consideration of “reasonably foreseeable indirect physical changes in the
environment which may be caused by the project” under the California Environmental Quality
Act).
288 See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 23, at 445.
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despite new information justifying such modification. Revision of
existing rules may also be perceived to shift blame. Where a legal rule is
malfunctioning, current political leaders can lay responsibility at the feet
of those leaders who developed the current rule. Once a revision is
made, any further malfunction will be charged to current leadership.
Dynamic law will also impose costs on regulated parties and other
affected constituencies. For example, a change in the SEC rules
governing the election of corporate boards may require companies
subject to those rules to redesign their election procedures. A change in
the emissions standards for nitrogen oxide may require companies to
retrofit existing facilities or change production techniques.
Uncertainty about legal rules may also chill investment. Where law
is stable and certain, private parties can rely on it to order their affairs. 289
Dynamic law injects uncertainty into the legal environment, and may
cause private parties to refrain from efficient investment, even if that
investment would generate a social surplus. For example, an energy
company may decide to forgo development of natural gas resources if
mitigation measures designed to protect the greater sage grouse remain
in flux and susceptible to significant change. 290 This reluctance is likely
to increase proportionally to the unpredictability of the legal regime. For
that reason, contingent regulation may chill investment less than
durational or adaptive regulation. Contingent regulation provides notice
about future legal rules, and regulated parties may be able to quantify
the costs of those future legal rules—and their probability of being
triggered—and invest accordingly. Durational or adaptive regulation
provide less notice of what future rules may be, thereby increasing the
planning challenge for regulated parties.
Finally, dynamic law will impose transitional costs. Even if the
ongoing cost of complying with a legal rule may be the same as
complying with a new rule, switching between the two may require
regulated parties to retrain employees, reformulate production
processes, or redesign products. Moreover, the individuals regulated by
the new rule will incur cognitive costs as they reorient their behavior to
conform to new requirements.
B.

Varieties of Uncertainty

The second variable lawmakers should consider is the type of
uncertainty that they face. Too often, uncertainty is viewed as

289
290

See supra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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monolithic. A more nuanced conception of uncertainty reveals that the
type of uncertainty involved in a decision has consequences for the
optimal type of law. 291
Consider the stylized example of the highway department seeking
to reduce accidents by modifying the speed limit. If the department has
high confidence in the prediction that a fifty-five miles per hour speed
limit will achieve the desired reduction in traffic accidents—in other
words, uncertainty is low—static law may be the best approach, because
the cost of promulgating static law is typically the lowest, and the
benefits of dynamism would also be low. If, instead, the department has
high confidence that adjusting the speed limit is the best approach to
increasing safety—but does not know precisely what speed limit is
necessary to achieve the desired reduction in accidents—it faces a
circumstance where there is uncertainty, but that uncertainty is cabined
to the degree of efficacy of the regulatory tool being deployed. Such
circumstances favor contingent regulation. Finally, if the department
has little confidence that adjusting the speed limit will improve safety,
and is unsure what other steps it should consider, it faces general
uncertainty about causation and the effectiveness of intervention. That
situation favors either an adaptive or durational approach, enabling the
department to consider other regulatory interventions such as enhanced
enforcement or increased penalties as new information emerges.
The inability to perfectly predict future conditions relevant to a
lawmaking enterprise—as with the highway department considering a
new speed limit—comes in at least three general varieties: risk,
foreseeable uncertainty, and unforeseeable uncertainty.
Risk involves circumstances where an identifiable set of future
conditions is likely to occur and the likelihood of each condition can be
ascertained. 292 For example, when BLM establishes a buffer zone around
sage grouse mating habitat, risk would be involved if BLM could
determine that a half-mile buffer has a twenty-five percent chance of
completely protecting that habitat, a fifty percent chance of slightly
291 This section discusses the degree of uncertainty that may exist. Varieties of uncertainty
can be differentiated across other metrics too, although those metrics have less relevance to
selecting a governance strategy. For example, some sources of uncertainty may be endogenous
to a legal regime and other sources exogenous. In other words, sometimes information does not
exist about the efficacy of a legal rule, or the harm caused by regulated activity, but uncertainty
may also exist about the context of regulation that is not linked to the regulatory effort itself.
For example, in regulating oil and gas development in order to protect the greater sage grouse,
BLM may be uncertain about the extent to which climate change is harming the species.
Climate change is not directly caused by development activities, nor is it sensitive to the
portfolio of management decisions that BLM has at its disposal. It is, therefore, exogenous to
the decision that is facing the agency, despite constituting an important factor for
consideration.
292 See POSNER, supra note 69, at 290.
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reducing the quality of the habitat, and a twenty-five percent chance of
destroying the quality of the habitat.
Uncertainty, and not risk, is involved if a reasonable estimate
cannot be derived of both possible future circumstances and the
likelihood that they will come to pass. Uncertainty itself can be further
subdivided. Some uncertainty is foreseeable and other uncertainty is
not. Donald Rumsfeld famously addressed this dimension of
uncertainty when he distinguished between “known unknowns,” and
“unknown unknowns.” 293 Known unknowns are foreseeable. That is
true even if no basis exists for estimating the likelihood that any one of a
discrete set of identifiable future conditions will occur.
Consider again BLM’s regulation of natural gas development and
the effects of such development on greater sage grouse populations.
Scientists may be able to foresee that development will affect the sage
grouse, and based on observation or experimentation, identify possible
aspects of development activities that cause harm. Sage grouse may
abandon breeding habitat because humans visit nearby oil and gas
infrastructure, because of the noise produced by such infrastructure, or
because certain other species are attracted to such infrastructure. The
magnitude of the effect of any of these vectors of disturbance or the
sensitivity of that vector to intervention may be unknown, but a
lawmaker would face foreseeable uncertainty in regulating, so long as
these are the possible causes of greater sage grouse decline and
mechanisms could be identified to address these causes, at least to some
extent. If, however, oil and gas development affects the greater sage
grouse through an entirely unrecognized pathway, it would constitute
unforeseeable uncertainty. For example, natural gas development may
actually affect sage grouse by increasing the frequency of wild fires, but
no one recognized that issue at the time a management regime was
created. Similarly, the emergence of a new technology that radically
reduces the effect that drilling activities have on sage grouse may be
unforeseeable. 294
The foreseeability of uncertainty may depend upon whether
uncertainty pertains to chains of causation or the magnitude of effects.
Understanding the relationship between the location of an oil and gas
well and reproductive success of the sage grouse involves two inquiries:
does proximity matter, and if so, how much does it matter. The first is a
question about causal connection, the second a question about
293 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD News Briefing—Secretary
Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.
294 For a discussion of the incorporation of new technology into pollution control standards,
see Blais & Wagner, supra note 174.
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magnitude. Uncertainty about the magnitude of effects generally creates
foreseeable uncertainty, whereas uncertainty about causation is more
likely to create unforeseeable uncertainty. 295 Contrast a situation where
land managers understand too little about a natural system to identify
likely causes of disturbance and one where land managers can identify
five causes of disturbance but do not know the significance of any one
cause. In the former circumstance, the managers face unforeseeable
uncertainty; in the latter, they face foreseeable uncertainty.
To the extent uncertainty is foreseeable—meaning that a potential
range of future circumstances can be identified—lawmakers can identify
substantive regulatory responses to address those possibilities. This will
be particularly efficacious where regulatory responses are relatively
simple. For example, where lawmakers are unsure about the future
frequency of an activity subject to regulation, and therefore cannot
identify the number of staff needed to effectively administer a program,
a rule could be created that automatically increases staffing alongside an
increasing prevalence of the activity. 296 In other words, contingent
regulation can effectively be deployed. On the other hand, if uncertainty
is unforeseeable, lawmakers can only create mechanisms for modifying
law as new information emerges. In other words, unforeseeable
uncertainty requires either durational or adaptive regulation.
C.

Lawmaker Resources

The third variable affecting tool selection is the amount of
resources available to a lawmaker. Lawmakers face dramatically
different obligations and have dramatically different resources with
which to carry out those obligations. Some lawmaking bodies have
jurisdiction over only a few decisions; others must consider a whole host
of competing priorities. 297 The Federal Open Market Committee, for
example, primarily wields but a single policy instrument: establishing
target interest rates and authorizing the purchase and sale of securities
to achieve those interest rates. 298 Legislative bodies of general
jurisdiction, on the other hand, face innumerable demands on their
attention. 299
295 Uncertainty about the future prevalence of a regulated activity generally involves
questions of magnitude, not of causation. See Wiseman, supra note 28, at 237–39
296 See id. at 247.
297 See, e.g., Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, supra note 33, at 253–54.
298 See Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV. 111, 112–15, 114 n.13 (1989).
299 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 839 (2006) (“[T]he police power [is] the
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An assessment of the resources possessed by a lawmaker requires
consideration of two measures. First, it must take into account the
volume of issues requiring the lawmaker’s attention. Identifying the
range of issues vying for position on an agenda will be defined, at least
in part, by the scope of a lawmaker’s legal authority. Resource
constraints inevitably require lawmakers to prioritize certain issues at
the expense of others, and many will be entirely neglected. 300 The more
limited a lawmaker’s resources, the less desirable dynamic law is,
particularly varieties that require substantial discretionary intervention
by lawmakers, such as durational regulation.
Second, an assessment of resources must take into account the
variable capacities of lawmakers to make decisions. Some have the
resources to make only a few decisions, while others can make a larger
number. Governance capacity may turn on a number of factors,
including the nature of the responsibilities of that body’s members, the
degree of expertise the body possesses, and the complement of staff
available to assist in formulation of policy. Contrast, for example, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve with Wyoming’s legislature.
The Board of Governors oversees a narrow, albeit extremely complex,
set of issue—monetary policy and banking regulation—and it has only a
handful of policy interventions at its disposal. 301 The Wyoming
legislature potentially has before it the full panoply of issues arising
under a state’s police power. 302 The Board of Governors is made up of
leaders in the financial field with a wealth of expertise. 303 The legislature
prides itself in being made up of every-day citizens, none of whom will
have expertise in every issue. 304 The Board of Governors has a staff of
more than 2,650. 305 Wyoming legislators lack even a single dedicated
staff person, and the legislature as a whole is served by a small non-

states’ reserved power to regulate to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare.”).
300 See Hirsch, supra note 76, at 1343–44. Conflicting demands on attention causes what is
referred to as “task interference,” whereby the attention paid to any particular task is a function
of the attention paid to other competing tasks. Id. at 1342–52.
301 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 4–6 (9th ed. 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_
complete.pdf.
302 See WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (“The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and house
of representatives, which shall be designated ‘the legislature of the State of Wyoming.’”).
303 See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Janet Y. Yellen, http://
www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/yellen.htm (last updated Feb. 3, 2014).
304 See Citizen’s Guide to the Wyoming Legislature, WYO. ST. LEGIS., http://
legisweb.state.wy.us/leginfo/guide98.htm (last updated 2002) (“Wyoming remains one of the
few states having a true part-time citizen legislature.”).
305 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RESERVE, 100TH ANNUAL REPORT
396 (2013).
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partisan office with less than fifty full-time employees. 306 The sixty
members of the legislature serve only part time and the legislature itself
convenes for an average of approximately one month a year. 307 The
members of the Board of Governors serve in their position full time. 308
Lawmakers, like individuals, also experience cognitive obstacles
when facing numerous competing demands on their attention.
Recognition of these obstacles flows from the concept of bounded
rationality, which explains that the human brain has limited resources,
and thus decision-making is naturally limited. 309 Bounded rationality
has spawned the entire literature of behavioral economics, and the
insights from this field are important when considering governance in
the face of uncertainty, because they underscore the restraints imposed
by the lawmakers' limited attention. Making law requires time, mental
energy, and attention; when this is in short supply, a legal regime
requiring constant tending will fail. As Adam Hirsch has succinctly
explained: “Governors are no less constrained in their mental resources
than are the governed.”310
The relative resource endowment of a lawmaker has significant
implications for governance selection. The more well-endowed with
resources the lawmaker, the more appropriate will be durational
regulation, which allows for greater discretion on the part of lawmakers
about if and when to revisit legal rules. Adaptive regulation, at least
when well defined, creates a mechanism to automatically trigger
reconsideration. Both strategies require a prolonged investment of
resources by the lawmaker, but durational regulation will often require
the greater investment. Therefore, where unforeseen uncertainty exists,
a lawmaker with fewer resources would do well to rely on adaptive
regulation.
CONCLUSION
Lawmakers must develop legal regimes to address problems even
when significant uncertainty exists about the nature of those problems
306 Legislative Service Office, WYO. ST. LEGIS., http://legisweb.state.wy.us/LSOWeb/
LegislativeServiceOffice.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2015).
307 Citizen’s Guide to the Wyoming Legislature, WYO. ST. LEGIS., http://legisweb.state.wy.us/
leginfo/guide98.htm#citizen (last updated 2002).
308 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2012); Who Are the Members of the Federal Reserve Board, and How Are
They Selected?, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm (last updated
July 22, 2015).
309 See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (1983); Hirsch, supra note 76,
at 1331.
310 Hirsch, supra note 76, at 1333.
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and the efficacy of legal responses. In doing so, lawmakers should be
realistic about the legal, political, and informational obstacles they face,
and design legal frameworks calibrated to effectively account for new
information in practice, rather than just in theory. This Article has
examined four types of mechanisms through which lawmakers can act.
Each has advantages and each will be best suited to certain problems in
particular contexts.
The four strategies are separate and distinct, but in practice the
boundaries separating one from another may blur. Sometimes a legal
mechanism may plausibly be characterized as more than one type of
regulation, and sometimes a legal regime will incorporate multiple
mechanisms. Indeed, combining tools may often achieve the best
outcome because most contexts involve multiple varieties of
uncertainty. Moreover, static law may be coupled with dynamic law to
obtain the benefits of each. For instance, a lawmaking body like
Congress may enact a legal framework providing broad static goals that
is separate and distinct from implementation of those goals, which may
be carried out by a subsidiary government entity, like a federal agency,
through dynamic law. 311 Aspects of the Endangered Species Act
function in just this fashion. Section 7 entirely prohibits federal agencies
from undertaking activities likely to jeopardize endangered species—a
static legal rule. 312 The Fish and Wildlife Service operationalizes that
broad command and, in doing so, often relies on adaptive regulation. 313
At other times, a single lawmaker may deploy multiple legal tools
to achieve a desired result. In BLM’s 2008 management plan for oil and
gas development near Pinedale, Wyoming, the agency attempted to
address potential impacts to the sage grouse by: (1) identifying specific
triggering events to automatically cause identified management
responses; (2) providing a means by which the agency could modify its
mitigation plans as new information became available; and (3)
establishing an annual meeting between BLM and regulated parties to
discuss mitigation efforts. 314 In other words, the plan attempts to
address the uncertainty attendant to developing oil and gas resources in
sage grouse habitat through adaptive, durational, and contingent
regulations.
311 Elements of the Clean Air Act provide a good example of this approach. As Ann Carlson
has explained, the Clean Air Act has proven “surprisingly adaptable, durable and innovative”
due, in part, to Congress’s use of broad statutory language to delegate authority to EPA. Ann
Carlson, Lecture, An Ode to the Clean Air Act, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 119, 120 (2014).
312 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012)).
313 See Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of
Social Engineering Over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896, 897 (2008).
314 See generally BLM 2008 SEIS APPENDIX, supra note 18, at 10-2 to -5.
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This Article provides a theoretical and analytic framework to
understand, assess, and choose among legal mechanisms that account
for the uncertainty that confronts lawmakers. Each approach to
governance has distinctive features, and distinguishing among them
provides analytical clarity. Such clarity yields immediate practical
benefits by enabling lawmakers to better structure governance.

